Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship

2014

Patent Law Federalism
Paul Gugliuzza
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Paul Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 Wisconsin Law Review 11 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/164

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly
Commons at Boston University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

PATENT LAW FEDERALISM
PAUL R. GUGLIUZZA*
Most lawsuits arising under federal law can be filed in either state or
federal court. Patent suits, however, may be filed only in federal court. Why
do patent cases receive exceptional treatment? The usual answer is that
federal courts, unlike state courts, provide uniformity and expertise in patent
matters. This Article analyzes whether exclusive jurisdiction actually serves
those policy aims and concludes that the uniformity-expertise rationale is
overstated. If exclusive federal patent jurisdiction is to be justified, attention
must also be given to pragmatic considerations, such as the respective quality
of state and federal trial courts, the courts’ ability to manage complex civil
litigation, and the preclusive effects of state court judgments. By
reconstructing the theoretical framework for exclusive federal patent
jurisdiction, this Article yields normative insights for institutional policy
more broadly. Most importantly, it suggests that legislative repeals of
exclusive jurisdiction—in any field of law—will be ineffective because
litigants, even if given a choice, will prefer the federal courts over
inexperienced and unfamiliar state courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Patents are usually thought to be a concern of the federal
government, not state governments. The federal Patent Act preempts
state laws offering patent-like rights for inventions not patentable under
federal law.1 Also, the federal courts have long had exclusive jurisdiction
over cases arising under the patent laws.2 In the America Invents Act of
2011, Congress further restricted the ability of state courts to hear
patent-related cases, extending exclusive federal jurisdiction to disputes
in which a patent issue appears only in a counterclaim.3
Yet the federal government’s absolute authority over the patent
system has recently been called into question. In May 2013, the State of
Vermont enacted the first-ever statute explicitly prohibiting bad faith
assertions of patent infringement,4 and several other states are poised to
enact similar laws.5 Over the past year, attorneys general in several states
have taken steps to fight so-called patent trolls, entities that often obtain
1.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156–57
(1989).
2.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
3.
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a), 125
Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)) (abrogating Holmes Grp., Inc. v.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002)).
4.
See H. 299 § 6, Gen. Assemb., 2013–14 Legis. Sess. (Vt. 2013) (codified at
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–99). Among other things, the Vermont statute creates a
civil claim for parties who are the target of bad faith infringement assertions and
authorizes the state attorney general to investigate and sue patent holders who make those
assertions. See id.
5.
As of early March 2014, Oregon had already enacted a ban on bad faith
assertions of infringement, see S.B. 1540, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2014), and bills
regulating infringement assertions were pending in several other states, see, e.g., S.B.
116, 2014 Gen. Assemb., 14th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2014); S. Paper 654, 126th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Me. 2014); Leg. B. 677, 103d Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2014); S.B. 1222, 2014 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014); S.B. 150, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014);
H.B. 375, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); Assemb. B. 656, 2013–14 Leg.,
101st Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014).
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quick settlements by threatening prohibitively expensive infringement
litigation.6 And the U.S. Supreme Court in Gunn v. Minton7 ruled that the
federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction simply because a legal
claim raises an issue of patent law.8 Specifically, the Court held that a
state court could hear a state law malpractice case against a patent
attorney even though the court would have to determine whether, but for
the attorney’s alleged negligence, the patent’s validity would have been
upheld in infringement litigation.9 The scope of the Gunn decision has
quickly become controversial in the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases.10 The court has suggested that
much of its jurisdictional case law, which severely limits the ability of
state courts to decide state law cases involving patents, “may well have
survived the Supreme Court’s decision.”11
Amid this growing tension over patent law federalism, scholars
have begun to debate what role—if any—state and local governments
should play in formulating patent law and policy.12 This Article adds to

6.
See News Release, Attorney General Jon Bruning, Attorney General
Bruning Investigating “Patent Trolls” (July 18, 2013), available at
http://www.ago.ne.gov/resources/dyn/files/1069520z2e735d6e/_fn/071813+Bruning+
Patent+Troll+Release+.pdf (describing an investigation by the Attorney General of
Nebraska into a law firm that represents patent trolls); Press Release, Office of the
Attorney Gen., Vermont Attorney General Sues “Patent Troll” in Groundbreaking
Lawsuit (May 22, 2013), available at http://www.atg.state.vt.us/news/vermont-attorneygeneral-sues-patent-troll-in-groundbreaking-lawsuit.php; Massachusetts AG Coakley
Takes Aim at ‘Patent Trolls’, INS. J. (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/east/2013/11/12/310941.htm (noting that the Attorney General of Massachusetts is
“exploring ways to end baseless patent trolling,” including litigation and state
legislation); Julie Samuels, Minnesota: Patent Trolls Are Not Welcome Here,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/
minnesota-patent-trolls-are-not-welcome-here (describing a settlement between the
Minnesota Attorney General and the same entity sued by the Attorney General of
Vermont). See generally Bernard Nash et al., Taming the Troll Toll—AGs Heighten
Scrutiny
of
Patent
Trolls,
ST.
AG
MONITOR
(Oct.
31,
2013),
http://www.stateagmonitor.com/2013/10/31/taming-the-troll-toll-ags-heighten-scrutinyof-patent-trolls (summarizing state attorney general actions against patent trolls).
7.
133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
8.
Id. at 1065.
9.
Id.
10.
See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction,
100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1453–64 (2012) (providing background on the Federal Circuit).
11.
Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 715 F.3d 1329,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
12.
See, e.g., Camilla A. Hrdy, Dissenting State Patent Regimes, 3 IP THEORY
78 (2013); Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in
Innovation, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 487 (2013); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism
and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449 (2010); Shubha Ghosh, Short-Circuiting
Contract Law: The Federal Circuit’s Contract Law Jurisprudence and IP Federalism
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that debate by asking a fundamental but surprisingly unanswered
question: Why do federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent
cases? For most cases involving federal law, state and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction.13 If a plaintiff files a case in state court that is
subject to federal jurisdiction, the defendant may choose to remove it to
federal court.14 But if both parties wish to litigate in state court, they are
free to do so. Why are patent cases treated differently?
Commentators have generally criticized regimes of exclusive
federal jurisdiction.15 Yet exclusive federal patent jurisdiction is often
defended on the assumption that the federal courts provide uniformity in
patent law and expertise in patent cases.16 This Article argues that those
assumptions are unjustified and develops a more nuanced framework for
rationalizing exclusive patent jurisdiction. This framework, which draws
on recent scholarship reconsidering the purpose of federal question
jurisdiction more generally,17 emphasizes pragmatic concerns such as the
respective quality of state and federal trial courts, the courts’ ability to
manage complex civil litigation, and the preclusive effects of state court
(Univ. of Wisc. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 1247, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2390214.
13.
See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
14.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).
15.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 297 (1996) (“If both parties are content to remain in state court, the court
probably is competent to decide the case. The argument for exclusive federal jurisdiction
in such cases, and therefore generally, is weak.”); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the
Allocation of Judicial Business between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction
and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1811 (1992) (arguing that
“virtually nothing” justifies exclusive jurisdiction); Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 383, 386 (1991) (“[A]s a matter of
policy, Congress should rarely provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction in any given
private civil cause of action.”); Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in
Private Civil Actions, 70 HARV. L. REV. 509, 517 (1957) (arguing that “exclusive
jurisdiction should rarely be conferred”).
16.
See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 183 (1969) (“In patent and copyright cases the federal
courts . . . have experience, which the state courts lack, and in these cases there is a
federal interest in the monopoly conferred by the patent or copyright that is more
important than the wishes of the parties.”); MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER,
RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 84 (1999)
(“[T]here seems little to be gained by permitting state courts to adjudicate admiralty,
patent, or copyright actions. Those actions have long been solely litigated in federal
courts, arguably have a greater need for uniformity, and for the most part lack significant
analogies to state common law.”); see also infra notes 87–93 and accompanying text
(discussing additional sources).
17.
See, e.g., John F. Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 247 (2007); Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as
Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L.
REV. 95 (2009).
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judgments. The framework also acknowledges the potential benefits of
concurrent state jurisdiction, such as opportunities for doctrinal
percolation and institutional innovation that do not currently exist in the
patent system.
Rethinking the state-federal divide in patent litigation yields several
normative insights. On balance, this Article does not definitively argue
for repealing exclusive federal jurisdiction. But suppose Congress
disagreed and decided to treat patent cases like most other federal
question cases: concurrent jurisdiction with a right of removal for
defendants. What would be the consequence of that reform? That is, who
would choose to litigate a patent case in state court? Probably no one.
Litigants, if given a choice, would almost certainly prefer the federal
courts—or, at least those federal courts that hear a substantial number of
patent cases—because patent lawyers are unfamiliar with state courts.
Future policy discussions about the creation or expansion of exclusive
federal jurisdiction—in any field of law—should acknowledge this path
dependence.
The entrenchment of exclusive federal patent jurisdiction and other
institutional arrangements in patent law, such as the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, has implications for current debates on
patent reform. Because of disagreements among innovating industries
about proposed changes to substantive patent law, reform efforts have
focused mostly on matters of procedure and institutional design. For
example, one common legislative proposal to combat patent trolls is to
make the losing party responsible for the winner’s attorneys’ fees in
patent litigation.18 These structural changes may prove difficult to undo
when they are no longer needed or if it turns out they were unwarranted
in the first place. This potential for entrenchment should be weighed in
the ongoing policy debates.19
Before proceeding to the body of the Article, one disclaimer is in
order: this Article’s discussion of patent law federalism focuses mostly
on judicial federalism, that is, the allocation of cases between state and

18.
The most notable proposal is the Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong.
§ 3 (2013), which passed the House in December 2013 and is pending in the Senate as
this Article goes to press. See Timothy B. Lee, Patent Reform Bill Passes the House 325
to 91, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2013, 2:02 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2013/12/05/the-house-votes-on-patent-reform-today-heres-what-you-need-toknow. Other recent fee-shifting proposals include the Patent Abuse Reduction Act of
2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong § 5 (2013), the Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 2013, S.
1612, 113th Cong. § 101 (2013), and the Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious
Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).
19.
On the phenomenon of institutional entrenchment in the broader context of
political decision making, see Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive
Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657 (2011).
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federal courts.20 It is certainly possible to consider patent law federalism
outside the judicial sphere; the Vermont statute and state
law-enforcement actions to fight abusive patent litigation are prime
examples. Current preemption doctrine, however, greatly circumscribes
the states’ ability to regulate patent enforcement conduct.21 Moreover,
although federalism concerns pervade discussions of state law
alternatives to patent rights (such as grants and tax incentives for
innovation),22 a rich literature explores how fiscal policy affects
innovation.23 Judicial federalism in patent law, by contrast, has to date
attracted less attention.24
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the
uniformity-expertise paradigm, showing how those policy objectives
have dominated institutional design in patent law. It also introduces a
novel and more nuanced terminology for discussing those objectives,
highlighting that uniformity sometimes refers to legal uniformity (that is,
the uniformity of patent doctrine) and at other times to adjudicative
uniformity (the uniform treatment of a particular patent from one case to
another). Likewise, expertise sometimes refers to judicial expertise in
patent matters specifically and at other times to a general ability to
manage complex litigation. Deploying this new vocabulary, Part II
challenges the assumptions that legal uniformity and patent-specific
expertise justify excluding state courts from hearing patent cases. Rather,
pragmatic concerns about preclusion, litigation efficiency, and case
management expertise make a stronger case for exclusive federal
jurisdiction. Part III highlights possible benefits of concurrent
state-federal jurisdiction and suggests that exclusive jurisdiction could be
abolished without bringing chaos to the patent system. It also explores
the difficulty of effectively repealing exclusive jurisdiction in any field
of law, situating exclusive jurisdiction within a broader theory of
20.
See SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 16, at 4.
21.
See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
22.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the
Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 320–26 (2013).
23.
See, e.g., Shaun P. Mahaffy, Note, The Case for Tax: A Comparative
Approach to Innovation Policy, 123 YALE L.J. 812, 814–15 nn.2–4 (2013) (collecting
citations).
24.
There are two classic studies of state jurisdiction over patent cases: Donald
Shelby Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts in
Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633 (1971), and Edward H. Cooper, State Law of
Patent Exploitation, 56 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1972). These articles remain highly pertinent
for their explorations of the history and justifications for exclusive federal patent
jurisdiction. However, the legal developments of the past forty years, such as the creation
of the Federal Circuit, the expansion of exclusive federal jurisdiction in the AIA, and the
budding interests of state governments in regulating patent enforcement, make the issue
of patent law federalism ripe for renewed consideration.
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institutional entrenchment. The Conclusion establishes a foundation for
future work, noting that any normative assessment of exclusive
jurisdiction should be tailored to the particular field of law being
examined.
I. THE UNIFORMITY-EXPERTISE PARADIGM
There is little historical evidence that concerns about uniformity and
expertise animated Congress’s decision to give the federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases. Today, however, exclusive
jurisdiction is usually assumed to serve those policy objectives.
Moreover, concerns about uniformity and expertise have dictated critical
decisions about the allocation of authority in the modern patent system.
A. The Origin of Exclusive Federal Patent Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has long held that state courts are presumptively
competent to hear cases arising under federal law.25 The state and federal
courts therefore share concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims unless
Congress “affirmatively ousts” the state courts of jurisdiction or there is
“a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal
interests.”26 Today, Section 1338(a) of the Judicial Code explicitly grants
the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases.27 Interestingly,
however, there is no consensus on exactly when the federal courts were
first given exclusive jurisdiction, and there is scant evidence on why
Congress chose to prohibit state courts from hearing patent cases.
A major reason it is difficult to understand the roots of exclusive
jurisdiction is that the language of early jurisdictional statutes was
unclear. The first patent law passed under the Constitution, the Patent
Act of 1790, created a claim for patent infringement28 but did not discuss
court jurisdiction over those claims. The Patent Act of 1793, however,
appeared to create concurrent jurisdiction over patent cases, providing
that damages for patent infringement “may be recovered in an action on
the case founded on this act, in the circuit court of the United States, or
any other court having competent jurisdiction.”29 In 1800, Congress
25.
See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136–37 (1876).
26.
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459–60 (1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
27.
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .
No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents . . . .”).
28.
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111.
29.
Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (emphasis added).
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revised the statute to eliminate the phrase “or any other court having
competent jurisdiction.”30 Although the resulting statute, which provided
that damages for infringement “may be recovered . . . in the circuit
court[s],”31 did not unambiguously divest the state courts of jurisdiction,
most commentators have concluded that the amendment did in fact
confer exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts.32 The Supreme Court
never addressed the issue of state jurisdiction under the 1800 statute.
However, in a case decided after Congress had revised the statute to
make federal jurisdiction expressly exclusive, the Court noted in dicta
that the 1800 statute “impl[ied]” that federal jurisdiction “was exclusive
of the State courts.”33
The jurisdictional analysis under the early statutes was further
complicated because it was not until 1819 that Congress granted the
federal courts jurisdiction over equity actions,34 that is, lawsuits seeking
injunctions against future infringement.35 That year, Congress passed a
statute providing that the federal circuit courts “shall have original
cognisance, as well in equity as at law, of all actions, suits, controversies,
and cases, arising under any law of the United States, granting or
confirming to authors or inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings, inventions, and discoveries.”36 Some courts operating under the
1819 statute determined that the jurisdiction conferred was not
exclusive.37 In the Patent Act of 1836, however, Congress changed the
jurisdictional statute from its original language, which provided that the
federal courts “shall have original cognisance” over equitable actions, to
read that “all actions, suits, controversies, and cases arising under any
law of the United States, granting or confirming to inventors the
exclusive right to their inventions or discoveries, shall be originally
cognizable, as well in equity as at law” in the federal courts.38 As with
30.
Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38.
31.
Id.
32.
See Chisum, supra note 24, at 636; Cooper, supra note 24, at 316; Note,
The Jurisdiction of State Courts over Cases Involving Patents, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 461,
461–62 n.1 (1931).
33.
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 140 (1876).
34.
Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481.
35.
See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 15 F. Cas. 697, 700 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1811) (No.
8,420) (declining jurisdiction over a case seeking an injunction against patent
infringement).
36.
Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, 481.
37.
See, e.g., Burrall v. Jewett, 2 Paige Ch. 134, 145–46 (N.Y. Ch. 1830) (“The
act of the 15th February, 1819, extended the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the
United States to suits both at law and in equity arising under the patent laws; but there is
nothing in that act which, either in terms or by necessary implication, renders that
jurisdiction *exclusive.”).
38.
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 17, 5 Stat. 117, 124 (emphasis added).
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the 1800 amendment to the jurisdictional statute for damages claims, this
change in wording seems, at least from a modern perspective, to be far
from an express divestment of state court jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court observed in 1881 that the relevant “section of the act of
1836 differs from the act of 1819 in one . . . particular only. It makes the
jurisdiction in patent causes of the court[s] of the United States
exclusive.”39
There is little evidence about why Congress gave the federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases, as there is effectively no
legislative history of these early jurisdictional provisions.40 Edward
Cooper, in his extensive survey of state court jurisdiction over patent
cases, concluded “that there is very little indication that the original
development of an exclusive federal jurisdiction reflected any studied
conclusion that state courts should be kept distant from the area of patent
law.”41 Nevertheless, a few inferences can be drawn from the historical
record. Notably, Cooper observed that state courts, in finding federal
jurisdiction to be exclusive under the early statutes, did not reason “that
the federal courts had any particular expertise, ability to develop
uniformity of doctrine, or position to protect the public interest.”42
Rather, the state courts offered more pragmatic reasons for declining
federal jurisdiction. For example, state courts were reluctant to invalidate
a patent issued by the federal government43 and to enforce a statute that,
because it imposed mandatory treble damages for infringement, appeared
to be penal in nature.44
39.
Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 194 (1881).
40.
Other commentators have noted the difficulty of researching the history of
these statutes. See, e.g., Dutch D. Chung, Note, The Preclusive Effect of State Court
Adjudication of Patent Issues and the Federal Courts’ Choice of Preclusion Laws, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 707, 721 (2000). I have been able to locate only one relevant
committee report for the early patent acts: a report from a Senate committee regarding the
Patent Act of 1836. See S. REP. NO. 24-338 (1836). That report contains no discussion of
the Act’s jurisdictional provision. Although there are records of Congressional debates
regarding the various patent statutes, those records are incomplete because floor debates
were not transcribed verbatim until 1851. See Congressional Publications, LIBR.
CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/congress/congress-general.html (last
visited Mar. 6, 2014). None of the records of debates I have located discuss the
jurisdictional provisions.
41.
Cooper, supra note 24, at 316.
42.
Id. at 317.
43.
See, e.g., Parsons v. Barnard, 7 Johns. 144, 145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810)
(“[A]s the act of Congress, on the subject of patent rights . . . gives the court power . . . to
declare the patent void, the state courts have, of course, no jurisdiction in the case . . . .”).
44.
See, e.g., Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N.Y. 9, 17 (1849) (noting that the treble
damages provision, among others, was “inapplicable to our state courts, and . . . cannot
be applied to them by congressional legislation”). The award of treble damages has not
been mandatory since the Patent Act of 1836, which placed the decision to award
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Likewise, Donald Chisum, in his thorough historical examination,
doubted whether Congress considered “the reasons frequently tendered
by modern commentators” as justifying exclusive jurisdiction, such as
uniformity and patent expertise.45 Chisum explained that lawmakers in
the early nineteenth century likely would not have believed “that state
judges could not be relied upon to decide accurately questions of federal
law, that federal judges were experts on federal law, and that greater
uniformity in the decision of important issues of federal law could be
achieved by concentrating litigation in the federal judiciary.”46 After all,
most cases involving federal law were still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state courts.47 Instead, like Cooper, Chisum concluded
that the reasons for conferring exclusive jurisdiction were likely “more
prosaic.”48 In particular, exclusive jurisdiction may have been animated
by concerns about “allowing a state court to annul the act of a high
federal officer” and the penal nature of the treble damages provision of
the Patent Act.49
B. Defining Uniformity and Expertise
Despite the murky historical record, concerns about uniformity and
patent expertise are regularly invoked to rationalize exclusive federal
jurisdiction and have come to dominate broader discussions of
institutional policy in patent law. Before tracing the emergence of this
uniformity-expertise consensus, it is helpful to carefully define the terms

enhanced damages within the trial court’s discretion. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5
Stat. 117, 123; see also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (modern enhanced damages provision).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has since held that state and federal courts share concurrent
jurisdiction over civil RICO claims, see Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 467 (1990), even
though the RICO statute provides for mandatory treble damages, see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(2012).
45.
Chisum, supra note 24, at 636.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 637. With the exception of a brief period in 1801–02, Congress did
not grant general federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts until 1875. See
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 744–45 (6th ed. 2009).
48.
Chisum, supra note 24, at 637.
49.
Id. (emphasis omitted). By quickly developing a regime under which the
federal government would issue patents, Congress provided some nationwide security of
patent rights, facilitating the development of national markets in patented goods. See B.
ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN
AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920, at 67 (2005). Exclusive jurisdiction,
therefore, might also be understood as an adjunct to a larger project of economic
nationalism, with any resulting uniformity or expertise a by-product, rather than an
explicit aim, of that project. Id. at 69–70.
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uniformity and expertise because both terms, despite their ubiquity, are
often invoked to refer to multiple, distinct concepts.
Uniformity, for instance, has two dimensions that are not always
distinguished in the academic literature and policy debates. The first
dimension, which I call legal uniformity, reflects the notion that the law
governing patent rights should be articulated and applied consistently
throughout the entire country. The second dimension, which I call
adjudicative uniformity, reflects the notions that the claims of a particular
patent should be construed similarly from one case to another and that
courts should not reach inconsistent validity findings regarding the same
patent.50
Expertise can also refer to two distinct concepts. Most discussions
of institutional policy in patent law contemplate what I have been calling
patent expertise: knowledge about patent law and the procedures relevant
to patent disputes. Yet, in rethinking the justifications for exclusive
federal jurisdiction, I offer the alternative concept of case management
expertise,51 which refers to the generalized capability of a court and its
judges to efficiently process complex litigation—patent litigation
included.
C. The Emergence of the Uniformity-Expertise Consensus
As the federal judicial system came into its modern form after the
Civil War, the policies of uniformity and expertise began to play leading
roles in discussions about institutional reform in patent law. For example,
as early as 1878, Congress considered bills to divert patent litigation to a
specialized court,52 and in 1900 a committee of the American Bar
Association urged the creation of a national “Court of Patent Appeals.”53
Those proposals were animated both “by the threatened diversity of nine
appellate courts of coördinate jurisdiction” on principles of patent law
50.
For a study distinguishing legal uniformity from adjudicative uniformity
(although using different terms), see Eileen M. Herlihy, Appellate Review of Patent
Claim Construction: Should the Federal Circuit Be Its Own Lexicographer in Matters
Related to the Seventh Amendment?, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 469, 513
(2009) (identifying, in the context of the standard of appellate review of patent claim
construction, a distinction between “uniformity in the formulation of the law” and
“uniformity in the application of the law in order to achieve ‘correct’ results in individual
cases and for individual patents”).
51.
See infra Part II.E.
52.
See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 176–77 (1928)
(summarizing early legislative efforts).
53.
See Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of the Committee of the Section of Patent,
Trade-mark, and Copyright Law, in REPORT OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 543, 547 (1900).
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(that is, concerns about a lack of legal uniformity) and by exemplary
cases in which a patent had been found valid in one circuit and invalid in
another (evidencing a lack of adjudicative uniformity).54
A desire for patent expertise was important, too. Commentators
studying early proposals sympathetically observed that a specialized
patent court would be useful because “[f]ederal judges have not often
had much experience at the patent bar” and patent litigation procedure
was “the specialized concern of those professionally engaged in this most
technical of the ‘federal specialties.’”55
The earliest proposals for a specialized patent court failed, but in
1929, Congress granted the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
jurisdiction over appeals from patent application proceedings at the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).56 Throughout the twentieth century,
commentators and judges continued to voice support for a specialized,
expert bench to handle all patent litigation.57 Although the organized bar
dropped its support for a patent court during the mid-twentieth century,58
that began to change in 1975, when an important congressional
commission, convened primarily in response to the explosive growth of
the federal courts’ caseload in the 1960s and early 1970s, asserted that
forum shopping was a major problem in patent cases.59 The reason for
this forum shopping, the commission concluded, was that the patent
regime lacked legal uniformity—some circuits were believed to be

54.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 52, at 177–78 (citing cases); see also
Paul M. Janicke, To Be or Not to Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (1887–1982), 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 649 (2001) (concluding that
“[w]hat seemed to be driving these early reform efforts was not particularly doctrinal, but
rather the excessive time required to relitigate the same patent in every circuit where
different infringers might appear”).
55.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 52, at 175–76.
56.
Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475, 1475–76.
57.
See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y.
1911) (Hand, J.); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 157
(1973). Not all distinguished commentators supported patent specialization, however.
See, e.g., William Howard Taft, President of the U.S., Address to Thirty-Fourth Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug. 31, 1911), in REPORT OF THE
THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 53, 55 (1911) (“I
regret to differ with some of my associates at the Bar who are patent lawyers in thinking
that [a court of patent experts] would be the best kind of a court. I think it is a great deal
better to take a first-hand lawyer and a first-class judge and make him a good patent
expert than it is to take a patent expert and try to make him a first-class lawyer and a
good judge . . . .”).
58.
See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court
to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 292–93.
59.
COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195, 220 (1975)
[hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT].
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hostile to patent rights and some were not.60 The commission, popularly
called the Hruska Commission in recognition of its chair, Senator Roman
Hruska of Nebraska, saw the root of the problem as “the lack of guidance
and monitoring by a single court whose judgments are nationally
binding.”61 The observations of the Hruska Commission cleared the way
for critical decisions by both Congress and the courts to put modern
patent law in the hands of a small number of institutions with patent
expertise.
D. Uniformity and Expertise in Action
The desire for uniformity and expertise in patent law is reflected in
three modern legislative decisions about institutional structure and in
many judicial opinions on important matters of patent doctrine. The first
institutional development was the creation of the Federal Circuit in the
early 1980s. By the late 1970s, in the wake of the Hruska Commission’s
report, a consensus emerged that patent law was unduly disuniform—
some regional circuits were perceived as “pro-patent,” while others were
“anti-patent.”62 This incoherence, according to influential observers, was
diminishing the value of patent rights and ultimately harming the global
competitiveness of American business.63 Although some have since
questioned the received wisdom about disuniformity in patent law,64 in
1982, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA),
which created the Federal Circuit and gave the new court exclusive
jurisdiction over all patent appeals nationwide, including appeals from
patent litigation in the district courts, patent application proceedings at

60.
Id.
61.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
62.
See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. 27,792 (1981) (statement of Rep. Railsback)
(“[W]e heard a great deal of testimony concerning the problem of forum-shopping which
presently is practiced in many different district courts around the country. For example, if
you wanted to bring a lawsuit which would have the effect of attacking the validity of an
existing patent, you would most likely file such a lawsuit in the [E]ighth [C]ircuit. On the
other hand, if you were trying to have a patent held valid, you would try and have the suit
filed in the [F]ifth [C]ircuit.”); see also HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at
370 (report of the Commission’s patent law consultants, James Gambrell and Donald
Dunner, concluding “that the lack of uniformity in decisions on patent-related issues has
been a widespread and continuing fact of life”).
63.
See ADVISORY COMM. ON INDUS. INNOVATION, INDUS. ADVISORY SUBCOMM.
ON PATENT & INFO. POLICY, REPORT ON PATENT POLICY 155 (1979). This report was
prepared as part of a “domestic policy review” initiated by President Jimmy Carter in
response to the economic malaise of the late 1970s. See id. at 147.
64.
See, e.g., Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Innovation and the U.S. Patent System,
1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 207, 228 & nn.61–62 (2006).
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the PTO, and investigations by the U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC) into the importation of goods alleged to infringe U.S. patents.65
Supporters of the FCIA, in accord with the uniformity-expertise
consensus, emphasized that the Federal Circuit would improve the
perceived incoherence in patent law and benefit the regional circuits by
removing technically complex patent cases from their dockets.66 The
legislative history of the statute reinforces the primacy of legal
uniformity, noting that “the central purpose [of the legislation] is to
reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal
doctrine that exist in the administration of patent law.”67 It also
emphasizes that the Federal Circuit would provide “expertise in highly
specialized and technical areas,” such as patent law.68
The second institutional development fueled by the
uniformity-expertise consensus was Congress’s creation of a Patent Pilot
Program in 2011.69 In the fourteen federal judicial districts participating
in the program, judges can make a special request to hear patent cases.70
Patent cases filed in those districts will still be assigned randomly among
all the court’s judges, but if the case is assigned to a judge who has not
requested to hear patent cases, that judge may decline the assignment.71

65.
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96
Stat. 25, 37–38 (1982).
66.
See Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Account,
41 AM. U. L. REV. 581, 585–88 (1992).
67.
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981).
68.
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
political economy of the Federal Circuit’s creation helps explain why support for a
centralized court for patent litigation finally coalesced in the late 1970s. In addition to the
“neutral virtues” of uniformity, expertise, and accuracy prominent in the legislative
history, Lawrence Baum has suggested that the creation of the court can be explained
though a “process stream” perspective, under which social problems and legal solutions
travel in separate streams and are joined together by entrepreneurial policymakers.
LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 45 (2011). Under this view, the Federal
Circuit can be perceived as a preexisting solution that could be attached to problems such
as caseload growth and economic malaise. Id. at 179. In addition, once those problems
were linked with the solution of a specialized court, invaluable political support came
from those who expected to benefit most from the creation of a court with an incentive to
strengthen patent rights: large corporations with extensive patent portfolios. See
Gugliuzza, supra note 10, at 1456–58 (citing additional sources).
69.
Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat.
3674 (2011).
70.
Id. § 1(a)(1)(A), (b)(1), 124 Stat. at 3674. For a list of participating districts,
see District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program, U.S. COURTS, (June 7, 2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/newsview/11-06-07/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_
Pilot_Program.aspx.
71.
Pilot Program § 1(a)(1)(B)–(C), 124 Stat. at 3674.
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In that event, the case will be reassigned to a judge who has requested to
hear patent cases.72
The preamble to the statute creating the Pilot Program states that the
program’s purpose is to “encourage enhancement of expertise in patent
cases among district judges.”73 The statute’s legislative history also
highlights the value of expertise, noting that patent cases at the trial level
present “unique challenges” because “judges tend to be generalists and
lay jurors tend to be unfamiliar with patent law concepts and untrained in
the sophisticated technologies that frequently lie at the heart of
litigation.”74
A final institutional development highlighting the policy primacy of
expertise and uniformity is a jurisdictional change made by the America
Invents Act (AIA). As discussed, federal trial courts have long had
exclusive jurisdiction over cases “arising under” the patent laws.75 In its
early days, the Federal Circuit held that this exclusive jurisdiction
included not only cases in which the complaint presented an issue of
patent law, but also cases in which the only patent issue appeared in a
counterclaim.76 The Supreme Court eventually rejected that rule, holding
that—as in other areas of federal law—the federal issue must appear in
the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint to establish federal jurisdiction.77
So, for example, if a patentee was sued for state law fraud for allegedly
stealing the invention he later patented and the patentee filed a
counterclaim for patent infringement, that case would not arise under
patent law and would be decided by a state court.78 In the AIA, however,
Congress extended exclusive federal jurisdiction to cases in which patent
law issues appear only in a counterclaim.79 The legislative history of the
AIA justifies this jurisdictional expansion by noting the potential for
“forum-shopping among the . . . state courts” and “erosion in the

72.
Id. § 1(a)(1)(D).
73.
Id. pmbl.
74.
H.R. REP. NO. 109-673, at 3 (2006).
75.
See supra Part I.A.
76.
See Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, 895 F.2d 736, 745 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (en banc).
77.
Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830
(2002); see also Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)
(articulating the well-pleaded complaint rule).
78.
See, e.g., R.F. Shinn Contractors, Inc. v. Shinn, No. 1:01CV00750, 2002
WL 31942135, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2002); see also Comins v. Flodesign, Inc., No.
3:05cv1193, 2006 WL 2349541, at *5 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2006) (remanding to state
court a case that presented a counterclaim to correct inventorship).
79.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a), 125 Stat.
284, 331 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)).
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uniformity or coherence in patent law that has been steadily building
since the [Federal] Circuit’s creation in 1982.”80
The uniformity-expertise consensus has also influenced important
judicial decisions about patent law. The Federal Circuit regularly invokes
the policy goal of promoting legal uniformity, particularly in cases that
allocate authority within the patent system. For example, in holding that
the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over state law malpractice
claims involving patents, the Federal Circuit emphasized that “Congress’
intent to remove nonuniformity in the patent law” would be defeated by
state court jurisdiction.81 Likewise, adjudicative uniformity has featured
prominently in patent decisions by both the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit. For example, in holding that the judge, not the jury,
should interpret the claims of a patent, the Supreme Court emphasized
“the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent” from
one case to another.82 And the Federal Circuit has touted the importance
of adjudicative uniformity as a reason to limit appellate deference to the
district courts.83
Finally, the policy aim of promoting patent expertise also influences
decision making on the Federal Circuit. Sometimes the court explicitly
extols the virtues of judicial expertise in patent law. For instance, in
holding that federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over patent-related
malpractice claims, the court emphasized that “federal judges . . . have

80.
H.R. REP. NO. 109-407, at 5 (2006), cited in H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 54
n.60 (2011) (House Report on America Invents Act, erroneously referencing H.R. REP.
NO. 109-405).
81.
Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285–86
(Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated by Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013); see also Midwest
Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc in
relevant part) (overruling case law that had applied regional circuit law rather than
Federal Circuit law to determine whether federal patent law preempted state law, noting
the court’s “obligation of promoting uniformity in the field of patent law”); Nobelpharma
AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc in
relevant part) (overruling case law that had applied regional circuit law rather than
Federal Circuit law to determine whether patent-related conduct violated federal antitrust
law, reasoning that applying Federal Circuit law would “avoid the danger of confusion
[that] might be enhanced if this court were to embark on an effort to interpret the laws of
the regional circuits” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
82.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996). But see
infra notes 113–15 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s recent decision in
Gunn, 133 S. Ct. 1059, which discounted concerns about adjudicative uniformity in
rejecting federal jurisdiction over patent-related state law claims).
83.
See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc) (“[T]his court’s role in providing national uniformity to the construction
of a patent claim . . . would be impeded if we were bound to give deference to a trial
judge’s asserted factual determinations incident to claim construction.”).
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experience in claim construction and infringement matters.”84 Often,
though, the role of expertise is more implicit and reflects a particular
normative conception about which institutions should have patent
expertise. As my prior work has shown, the Federal Circuit has
developed various doctrines of patent law, jurisdiction, and procedure
that limit the power of district courts, the PTO, and the ITC and ensure
that the Federal Circuit is the only expert patent institution.85 Although
the excluded institutions all have the potential to inject additional patent
expertise into the system, that potential remains largely unrealized.
II. QUESTIONING THE UNIFORMITY-EXPERTISE CONSENSUS
The policy premises that uniformity and expertise are normatively
desirable in patent law have to date gone mostly uncontested.86 The
handful of observers to specifically consider the justifications for
exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent cases have likewise cited the
uniformity and expertise assumed to flow from exclusive jurisdiction. An
influential study prepared by the American Law Institute in the late
1960s, for example, concluded that exclusive patent jurisdiction should
continue because “the federal courts . . . have experience” in patent
cases, “which the state courts lack,”87 and other commentators have
agreed that the patent expertise of the federal courts supports exclusive
jurisdiction.88 Scholars have also suggested that the “arguably . . . greater
84.
Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.,
504 F.3d 1262, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
85.
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1791, 1852 (2013).
86.
For two exceptions, see Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking
Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1623 (2007); Cecil D.
Quillen, Jr., Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction—A Short Comment, 100 GEO. L.J.
ONLINE 23, 24 (2012), available at georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2012/06/
QuillenOnlineFinal.pdf. It should be noted that the perceived desirability of uniformity
and expertise is a phenomenon not unique to the United States. The European Union, for
instance, recently agreed to create a Unified Patent Court with exclusive trial and
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving certain European patents. See generally
Unified Patent Court, EUR. PAT. OFF., http://www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary/patentcourt.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2013). The agreement, which awaits ratification as this
Article goes to press, recites the objective of ameliorating “the significant variations
between national court systems” and “ensur[ing] expeditious and high quality decisions”
in patent cases. Agreement on a Unified Patent Court at 3–4, Eur. Union, Feb. 19, 2013,
available
at
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/
A1080B83447CB9DDC1257B36005AAAB8/$File/upc_agreement_en.pdf.
87.
AM. LAW INST., supra note 16, at 183.
88.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 15, at 512 (arguing that “support for a grant of
exclusive jurisdiction is furnished by the probability that the federal bench will be better
equipped to cope with the technical problems inherent in actions under a particular
statute,” such as the Patent Act, and that “it would . . . seem desirable to place difficult
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need for uniformity” in patent law as compared to other areas of federal
law justifies exclusive jurisdiction.89 The Federal Circuit, too, has
extended the concerns about uniformity that animated its creation90 to
justify the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district courts. In
particular, in decisions construing exclusive federal jurisdiction to cover
patent-related claims created by state law, the court has regularly referred
to “Congress’ intent to remove non-uniformity in the patent law, as
evidenced by its enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982.”91 Even justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have invoked the
uniformity-expertise paradigm to rationalize exclusive federal patent
jurisdiction.92
In his noteworthy study of state court jurisdiction over patent cases,
Professor Edward Cooper aptly summarized the prevailing rationale for

federal litigation,” such as patent litigation, “exclusively before the federal bench, since
limiting the number of courts through which litigation passes will serve to increase the
experience and thus the competence of individual courts”); Note, supra note 32, at 468
(noting that the federal courts are “presumably more competent” in handling the
“technical questions” that arise in patent litigation); see also POSNER, supra note 15, at
296 (“I have more sympathy with the argument that some federal statutes, well-illustrated
by the antitrust and intellectual property (patent, copyright, and trademark) statutes,
involve a high level of analytical difficulty that would baffle many state courts and lead
to many erroneous decisions . . . .”).
89.
SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 16, at 84; accord POSNER, supra note 15,
at 296 (“Another factor [favoring exclusive federal jurisdiction] is the interest in national
uniformity of legal obligation when, as is frequently the case in such fields as antitrust
and intellectual property . . . a single business activity affects many states and so would
bring the actor under the potential jurisdiction of many different state court systems,
which might impose conflicting obligations . . . .”); Note, supra note 15, at 511 (“One
result of the grant of exclusive patent jurisdiction may have been to diminish the
likelihood of conflicting decisions on a particular patent.”).
90.
See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
91.
Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); accord Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318,
1330–32 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“In enacting the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,
which created this court, Congress made manifest its intent to effect ‘a clear, stable,
uniform basis for evaluating matters of patent validity/invalidity and
infringement/noninfringement,’ so as to ‘render[] more predictable the outcome of
contemplated litigation, facilitate[] effective business planning, and add[] confidence to
investment in innovative new products and technology.’ To achieve those goals, we
conclude . . . that validity and enforceability represent federal interests of great stake over
which . . . we should exert our appellate jurisdiction under section 1295(a)(1) via section
1338(a) jurisdiction. To conclude otherwise would undermine Congress’s expectations
for this court.” (citations omitted, alterations in original)).
92.
See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 628, 650 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[s]ound reasons” support
exclusive federal patent jurisdiction: “[U]niformity, and familiarity with the extensive
and relevant body of patent jurisprudence are matters of overriding significance in this
area of law”).
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exclusive federal jurisdiction, which emphasized, as usual, uniformity
and expertise:
Exclusive jurisdiction is ordinarily attributed to suppositions
that federal courts possess a greater expertise in the often
highly technical questions raised by patent law; that uniform
interpretation and application of patent law may be promoted
by limiting the nature of the tribunals in which suit may be
brought and by easing the availability of federal appellate
review at some level; and that there is a strong public interest
in correctly defining the limits of the rights conferred by a
patent “monopoly” which increases the need for uniformity and
expertise beyond the need arising from mere concern with the
interests of the parties to the infringement suit.93
This Part questions the validity of the “suppositions” Cooper
identified: that exclusive jurisdiction provides both uniformity and
expertise. It concludes that pragmatic concerns about the preclusive
effects of judgments in patent cases and the respective quality of state
and federal trial courts provide a more complete case for keeping patent
litigation exclusively in federal court.
A. Modern Jurisdictional Doctrine: An Emerging Tension over Patent
Law Federalism
A summary of modern jurisdictional doctrine helps set the stage for
rethinking federal patent jurisdiction. It also illustrates the emerging
policy tension about the optimal allocation of patent authority between
the state and federal governments. On one side stand Congress and the
Federal Circuit, which have been reluctant to allow state courts to decide
patent issues. On the other side stand the Supreme Court, which recently
narrowed federal jurisdiction in Gunn v. Minton, and states such as
Vermont, Nebraska, and Minnesota, which have tried to combat abusive
patent litigation.
By statute, the federal district courts have original jurisdiction over
cases “arising under” federal law94 and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
“arising under” federal patent law.95 The Supreme Court has interpreted
the “arising under” language of both sections similarly.96 Claims created
by federal law, such as claims for patent infringement, almost always
93.
94.
95.
96.

Cooper, supra note 24, at 315.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
§ 1338(a).
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988).
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cause a case to arise under federal law.97 However, a case presenting
only claims created by state law can still be subject to federal jurisdiction
if the case involves “a federal issue [that] is: (1) necessarily raised,
(2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in
federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by
Congress.”98 For example, the Supreme Court held that a state law quiet
title claim was subject to federal question jurisdiction when ownership of
the property turned on the interpretation of a federal tax statute.99
As noted, Congress in the AIA expanded exclusive federal
jurisdiction to encompass cases in which patent issues appear only in a
counterclaim.100 The Federal Circuit has also embraced a broad view of
the types of state law claims subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction,
including practically any state law claim that raises an issue of patent
validity, enforceability, or infringement. For example, the court has held
that state law tort claims based on allegedly false accusations of patent
infringement arise under patent law,101 as do state law breach of contract
claims that require analysis of patent infringement.102 Also, the Federal
Circuit had held that effectively all claims for legal malpractice against
patent attorneys arise under patent law because those claims usually
require the court to assess what either the PTO or a federal court hearing
an infringement case would have done but for the attorney’s
negligence.103
The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s malpractice case
law in its 2013 decision in Gunn.104 In that case, plaintiff Vernon Minton
sued his former attorneys for malpractice under Texas law.105 The
attorneys had handled an earlier patent infringement case filed by
Minton, and that case ended when the federal courts invalidated
Minton’s patent under the on-sale bar of the Patent Act, which forbids
97.
See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 748–49 (2012).
98.
Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013).
99.
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
314–15 (2005).
100. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318,
1331 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986
F.2d 476, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
102. See, e.g., Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp., 532 F.3d 1330, 1334 n.5 (Fed.
Cir. 2008). A classic example of a contract claim that arises under patent law is a claim
for breach of a patent license agreement. See U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
103. Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.,
504 F.3d 1262, 1269–70 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski,
LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285–86 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
104. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1063, 1065 (2013).
105. Id. at 1062–63.
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patenting an invention that was on sale more than one year before the
patent application was filed.106 Minton’s malpractice theory was that his
attorneys had been negligent by not raising the experimental use
exception to the on-sale bar.107 Minton initially filed his malpractice case
in Texas state court, where he lost on summary judgment, but the Texas
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case should be dismissed
because it was within the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction.108
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Texas Supreme Court, ruling
that “state legal malpractice claims based on underlying patent matters
will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law.”109 Although the Court
phrased its holding in terms of patent malpractice, its reasons for
rejecting federal jurisdiction should apply to many different types of
patent-related state law claims. Notably, the Court engaged the
uniformity and expertise justifications typically invoked to expand
federal power and found them insufficient to justify federal
jurisdiction.110 The Court noted that allowing state courts to decide
patent-related malpractice suits would not undermine the uniformity of
patent law because “federal courts are . . . not bound by state court
case-within-a-case patent rulings.”111 The Court emphasized that the law
in “actual patent cases” (that is, federal lawsuits involving patent
infringement) would remain uniform because of the exclusive
jurisdiction of both the district courts and the Federal Circuit.112
In addition to dismissing concerns about legal uniformity, the Court
also rejected an argument sounding in adjudicative uniformity: that
federal jurisdiction was justified because patent rulings in state law cases
could give rise to issue preclusion in later infringement litigation.113 The
Court, however, emphasized that any preclusive effects “would be
limited to the parties and patents that had been before the state court.”114
“Such ‘fact-bound and situation-specific’ effects,” the Court noted, “are
not sufficient to establish federal arising under jurisdiction.”115

106. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (on-sale bar).
107. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1063; see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55,
64 (1998) (explaining the experimental use exception).
108. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1063.
109. Id. at 1065.
110. Id. at 1067.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see MGA, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 735 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (granting preclusive effect to state court ruling on patent infringement).
114. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068.
115. Id. (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S.
677, 701 (2006)).
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The Court also determined that the federal courts’ relative expertise
in patent law did not justify federal jurisdiction. Its opinion bluntly noted
that “the possibility that a state court will incorrectly resolve a state
claim,” “even if the potential error finds its root in a misunderstanding of
patent law,” does not justify federal jurisdiction over the state law
claim.116 The Court emphasized that although “resolution of a patent
issue in the context of a state legal malpractice action can be vitally
important to the particular parties in that case,” “something more,
demonstrating that the question is significant to the federal system as a
whole, is needed” to establish federal jurisdiction.117
The Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion rebuked the Federal
Circuit’s expansive view of federal jurisdiction. Yet the Federal Circuit
has limited the impact of Gunn by reemphasizing the importance of
adjudicative uniformity in patent-related state law cases. In Forrester
Environmental Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.,118 a
case decided less than three months after Gunn, the Federal Circuit
asserted that its case law extending exclusive federal jurisdiction to
patent-related torts besides legal malpractice “may well have survived
the Supreme Court’s decision.”119 Forrester involved state law tort
claims based on allegedly false accusations of patent infringement.120
The court ultimately held that federal jurisdiction did not exist because
the accusations concerned conduct that took place entirely in Taiwan,
where the relevant U.S. patents could not possibly be infringed.121 Still,
the court used the opportunity to distinguish Gunn from its older case
law and to invoke the policy of adjudicative uniformity:
Unlike the purely “backward-looking” legal malpractice claim
in Gunn, permitting state courts to adjudicate disparagement
cases (involving alleged false statements about U.S. patent
rights) could result in inconsistent judgments between state and
federal courts. For example, a federal court could conclude that
certain conduct constituted infringement of a patent while a
state court addressing the same infringement question could
conclude that the accusation of infringement was false and the
patentee could be enjoined from making future public claims
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 715 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
119. Id. at 1334.
120. Id. at 1332.
121. Id. at 1334–35; see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89
(1998) (noting that “[d]ismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . is
proper . . . when the claim is so . . . completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal
controversy” (internal quotation omitted)).

2014:11

Patent Law Federalism

33

about the full scope of its patent as construed in federal
court.122
The Federal Circuit’s reasoning is problematic on several accounts.
First, it ignores that the federal court’s finding of infringement (or, for
that matter, any other finding made by the federal court) would prevent
the parties from relitigating that issue in state court. Under the doctrine
of issue preclusion (sometimes referred to as collateral estoppel), the
parties to a case are prohibited from relitigating any issue decided in that
case.123 Although there is little case law on the specific question of the
preclusive effect of federal patent rulings in later state court litigation,
the preclusive effect of federal court rulings in federal question cases is
determined by federal law.124 Federal law would plainly prohibit
relitigation of infringement or validity between the same parties,125 so a
state court confronted with a prior federal judgment ought to refuse to
reopen those issues.126
122.
123.
124.

Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334–35 (citation omitted).
Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
See 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4468 nn.31–32 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2013).
125. See Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1310–11
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“It is undisputed that as a result of collateral estoppel, a judgment of
invalidity in one patent action renders the patent invalid in any later actions based on the
same patent.”); see also Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk
Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (applying issue preclusion
to the issue of infringement).
126. If the subsequent case was not between the same parties, the preclusion
analysis would be different. For example, it would be possible for a federal court in an
infringement action to find a patent valid and infringed and for a state court, hearing a
subsequent dispute between the same patentee and a different party, to find the patent
invalid or not infringed. See infra note 251 and accompanying text. Yet the Federal
Circuit in Forrester worried about federal and state courts reaching inconsistent results
on the “same infringement question,” Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334 (emphasis added),
which would not be possible under federal preclusion doctrine, except in the unusual
situation in which two parties manufactured the exact same allegedly infringing device or
practiced the exact same allegedly infringing method.
In any case, the proposed Innovation Act, which passed the House in December
2013 and is pending in the Senate as this Article goes to press, appears to side with the
Federal Circuit in stating that the possibility of conflicting judgments should create
federal jurisdiction over a state law claim. The bill states: “The Federal interest in
preventing inconsistent final judicial determinations as to the legal force or effect of the
claims in a patent presents a substantial Federal issue that is important to the Federal
system as a whole.” Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 9(f)(1) (2013). Because
the bill focuses on inconsistent rulings about “the legal force or effect” of a patent, it
would not seem to overrule cases that, like Gunn, involve patent claims no longer in
force. But if a state law claim involved an embedded patent issue regarding a patent still
in force, the language intimates that the case should be subject to exclusive federal
jurisdiction, as the Federal Circuit suggested in Forrester. That said, the statement of
federal interest in the bill is dubious because, even if all patent-related cases were
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Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Forrester is
inconsistent with Gunn. The Supreme Court had emphasized that to
determine whether a federal issue is “substantial” enough to justify
federal jurisdiction, courts should not “focus[] on the importance of the
issue to the plaintiff’s case and to the parties before it” because the
federal issue “will always” be significant to the parties.127 Rather, the
Court instructed that “[t]he substantiality inquiry . . . looks . . . to the
importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole.”128 The Federal
Circuit’s suggestion that inconsistent judgments between the parties to
one case could justify federal jurisdiction focuses improperly on
case-specific preclusion concerns, which the Supreme Court explicitly
stated were insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction.129
In sum, the jurisdictional doctrine governing patent cases illustrates
a clear policy tension about the optimal allocation of authority in the
patent system. Congress and the Federal Circuit seem intent on
expanding federal power, while the Supreme Court has created the
possibility for greater involvement by the states. And the states
themselves are signaling interest in patent policy. For example, the
Attorney General of Vermont has filed a consumer protection lawsuit
against a well-known patent troll;130 the Attorney General of Minnesota
recently concluded an investigation into that same patent troll;131 and the
Attorney General of Nebraska sent a cease-and-desist letter to a law firm
that represents numerous patent trolls.132 Although state laws imposing
liability for assertions of patent infringement are preempted by the
federal Patent Act to the extent that they prohibit assertions not made in
litigated exclusively in federal court, the possibility of inconsistent judgments about the
validity of a single patent would still exist. That is because a patentee whose patent has
been ruled valid in one case typically may not assert that prior judgment offensively
against subsequent infringers. See Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705,
710–11 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also infra notes 240–44 and accompanying text (discussing
the federal doctrines of offensive and defensive non-mutual issue preclusion).
127. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1066 (2013).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1068; see also supra notes 113–17and accompanying text.
130. See Consumer Protection Complaint at 1–8, Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs.,
LLC, No. 282-5-13wncv (Vt. Super. Ct. May 8, 2013), available at
http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/files/Vermont%20v%20MPHJ%20Technologies%
20Complaint.pdf.
131. See Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. Lori Swanson, Attorney
General Lori Swanson Announces First-in-the-Nation Order to Stop Delaware Company
From “Patent Trolling” in Minnesota (Aug. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/130820StopPatentTrolling.asp.
132. See Letter from Jon Bruning, Attorney Gen. of Neb., to M. Brett Johnson,
Partner, Farney Daniels LLP (July 18, 2013), available at http://www.ago.ne.gov/
resources/dyn/files/1069534z3005a836/_fn/071813+Farney+Daniels+LLP+-+Cease+%
26+Desist+Letter+and+Civil+Investigative+Demand.pdf.
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bad faith,133 this disagreement over the proper balance of power
reinforces the need to assess the theoretical bases for exclusive federal
patent jurisdiction, a task to which this Article now turns.
B. Exclusive Jurisdiction and Legal Uniformity
Uniformity enjoys an exalted status in virtually all areas of the law,
and in patent law particularly so.134 The Supreme Court, for instance, has
identified “national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property” as
“[o]ne of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and Copyright
Clauses of the Constitution.”135 But does exclusive federal jurisdiction
actually provide uniformity in patent law, as many observers have
assumed?136
Before answering that question, it is essential to engage both an
objection to even entertaining the possibility of concurrent state-federal
jurisdiction over patent cases and a question about measuring legal
uniformity. The objection is that even if the federal courts provide a low
level of legal uniformity, the federal courts offer more uniformity than
would prevail if patent cases were subject to jurisdiction in the courts of
all fifty states. The relative uniformity provided by federal courts, under
this argument, justifies exclusive federal jurisdiction, end of story. In my
view, however, there would not be a significant difference in amount of
legal uniformity between the current regime of exclusive federal
jurisdiction and an alternative regime of state-federal jurisdiction. State
court decisions on matters of patent law would have no precedential
effect in the federal courts, so federal patent law would remain as
uniform as it is today. Moreover, state courts would likely follow federal
precedent on most issues of patent law,137 and state courts would
themselves be bound by Supreme Court patent precedent. Even if a state
court declined to follow federal precedent on a particular issue, there are
only a small number of plausible approaches to most legal questions.138
133. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 1367,
1374–77 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., No.
8:13CV215, 2013 WL 5466956, at *8 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2013) (enjoining the Attorney
General of Nebraska from enforcing the cease-and-desist letter absent allegations that the
law firm acted in bad faith).
134. Nard & Duffy, supra note 86, at 1619–20.
135. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989);
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
136. See supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text.
137. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
138. See Preis, supra note 17, at 261 (showing that circuit splits rarely break
more than two or three ways).
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In addition, as discussed in more detail below, any legal uniformity
provided by exclusive federal jurisdiction may not be normatively
desirable.139 Rather, the patent system might benefit from the doctrinal
percolation possible in a regime in which patent cases were not
centralized in the federal courts.
The discussion of “amounts” and “levels” of legal uniformity leads
to the question: In analyzing whether exclusive federal jurisdiction is
justified by the legal uniformity it provides, how do we define the
normatively optimal amount of legal uniformity? Constructing an
all-encompassing quantitative metric of uniformity in patent law, and
then deploying that metric to define an ideal amount, would be a project
too large for this space. For present purposes, however, quantitative
precision is not required. As I argue below, there is a reasonable
argument that the patent law uniformity currently provided by the federal
courts is far from absolute.140 This deficit—whatever its precise size—
casts some doubt on the uniformity premise undergirding exclusive
jurisdiction. It is therefore worthwhile to at least consider other
justifications for exclusive jurisdiction.
One starting point for determining whether the current regime of
exclusive jurisdiction actually provides legal uniformity is to look at the
numbers. Gil Seinfeld, for example, has rejected the uniformity rationale
for general federal question jurisdiction in part because a system with
ninety-four judicial districts, thirteen courts of appeals, and 1,200 judges
cannot be expected to achieve significant doctrinal coherence.141 At first
blush, those numerical concerns map nicely onto patent law. Congress
granted the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases in the
earliest days of the federal judiciary. In 1800, there were twenty-three
federal judges, total: seventeen district judges and six Supreme Court
Justices.142 A regime with such a small number of judges and a miniscule
number of patent cases143 was capable of providing legal uniformity.
Today, the number of federal judges is fifty times larger and the number
of patent cases is exponentially higher. Yet there are unique aspects of
the patent litigation system, both at the appellate and trial levels that
could enable the federal courts to provide legal uniformity despite the
larger size of the modern judiciary.
139. See infra Part II.C.
140. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
141. See Seinfeld, supra note 17, at 116.
http://www.uscourts.gov/
142. Authorized
Judgeships,
U.S. COURTS,
JudgesAndJudgeships/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/alljudgeships.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
143. See B. Zorina Khan, Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early
Nineteenth-Century America, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 58, 63 (1995) (identifying 116 reported
patent cases from 1800 through 1839).
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1. LEGAL UNIFORMITY ON APPEAL
The most singular institutional aspect of federal patent litigation is
the nationwide appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. In areas of
federal law subject to regional circuit jurisdiction, circuit splits can fester
and legal disuniformity in the district courts can be policed only within
each circuit. On questions of patent law, by contrast, circuit splits are
practically impossible, and the Federal Circuit can monitor divergence
among the district courts. In theory, this model of exclusive district court
jurisdiction, coupled with appellate centralization, should provide legal
uniformity.
In practice, however, the possibility of disuniformity within the
Federal Circuit is real. Patent lawyers have long believed that results of
Federal Circuit appeals depend on the composition of the panel.144 One
of the first empirical investigations into uniformity in the Federal Circuit
concluded that the court’s judges deployed two distinct methods on the
all-important question of patent claim construction: a “procedural
approach,” which begins with a presumption that the words of the claim
should be given their ordinary meaning, and a “holistic” approach, which
is a more “free-form” analysis, “seeking the correct meaning according
to the particular circumstances presented.”145 The study also confirmed
the panel-dependence perceived by Federal Circuit practitioners,
showing that claim construction outcome often changed depending on
whether the panel was composed of judges who favored one approach or
the other.146 The authors of the original study recently updated their
analysis and found that the methodological split remains in Federal
Circuit claim construction law.147 Indeed, one commentator has
suggested that the court sometimes deploys a third, distinct methodology,
which examines the patent’s specification to determine the patentee’s
“actual invention” and then adjusts the claim language to capture that

144. See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1191 (1999).
145. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1133–34
(2004). Claim construction is critically important because the claims’ meaning will often
determine whether or not the defendant’s product or method infringes. See Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always to
decide the case.”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
146. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 145, at 1170–71.
147. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 123–50 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed.,
2013).
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invention.148 Moreover, another recent study examined the court’s
jurisprudence on the doctrine of equivalents, which permits a finding of
infringement even when there is no infringement of the letter of the
patent claims, and concluded that the court’s law exhibits “noticeable
heterogeneity,” with the “court quite tolerant of jurisprudential
diversity.”149
Another source of disuniformity in Federal Circuit patent law is the
high rate of dissent by its judges. One of the first studies into this issue
showed that Federal Circuit judges dissented more frequently than judges
in four out of five regional circuits used as a control and concluded that
the “high rate of dissent pushes against the notion of overuniformity
within the circuit.”150 A more recent study showed that the rate of dissent
in the Federal Circuit has dramatically increased since 2005, with
dissents being filed in roughly 25 percent of precedential patent decisions
and only about 60 percent of precedential patent opinions achieving
unanimity.151

148. See Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the En Banc Federal Circuit
Chose the Wrong Claim Construction Issue, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43, 46 n.18
(2013), available at http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/
uploads/Dialogue/Reilly_Online_Final.pdf.
149. Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 428
(2009). As a normative matter, Petherbridge generally defends this heterogeneity, noting
that it allows the court “the flexibility to reach what it sees as the right result in most
cases [but] could still promote uniformity of doctrinal development by utilizing a
judiciary that is . . . highly skilled and capable of great nuance in interpreting patent law.”
Id. at 472–73.
150. Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity within the Federal
Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 815–18
(2010). The rate of dissent in the Federal Circuit was 3.51 percent, and the rates in the
regional circuits ranged from 1.14 percent to 4.56 percent. Id. at 815. When limited to
patent cases, the Federal Circuit’s dissent rate increased to 9.28 percent. Id. at 816.
151. Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Disuniformity 12–13 (Univ. of Iowa,
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-42, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2351993. Another oft-cited source of legal disuniformity in the Federal Circuit
is the seemingly high rate at which the court reverses district court decisions on claim
construction. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim
Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 239 (2005); David L.
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal
Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 234 (2008). More recent data, however,
shows that the Federal Circuit’s claim construction reversal rate is declining. See J. Jonas
Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical, Empirical, and
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014) (manuscript at 38–39, 43), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150360. In any
event, inferring legal disuniformity from reversal rates raises concerns about selection
bias because the cases that make it to a final appellate judgment are more likely to be
cases that could reasonably be decided either way. See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra,
at 5–6.
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Despite this evidence of disuniformity, it may still be reasonable to
believe that the twelve judges of the Federal Circuit, sitting in one
courthouse, will articulate patent doctrine in a coherent fashion in the
mine run of cases.152 Therefore, this thinking would go, it makes sense to
keep patent cases exclusively in federal court where they will be
governed by the uniform doctrine articulated by the Federal Circuit. Yet,
even if the Federal Circuit is coherently articulating doctrine, legal
uniformity can be undermined by instability in that doctrine over time.
After all, a primary reason legal uniformity is desirable is so parties can
confidently predict how the actions they take today will be treated by the
law in the future.153 For example, a firm deciding whether to embark on
an expensive research and development project may find it useful to
know in advance if the anticipated fruits of the project will be patentable.
Under the Federal Circuit, however, important principles of patent
law have frequently been in flux. At least one commentator has
suggested that the Federal Circuit sits en banc more frequently than any
other circuit,154 although the quantitative scholarship on that question is
not unanimous.155 A qualitative review of en banc Federal Circuit
decisions, however, confirms that the Federal Circuit is eager to
reconsider and change important principles of patent law. In the past five
years alone, the court has convened en banc to reconsider crucial
questions such as: the standard of review for claim construction,156 the
patent eligibility of business methods157 and computer software,158
whether the “written description” requirement is an independent element
of patentability,159 and the standard for patent misuse.160 Moreover, the

152. For an early qualitative study concluding that the Federal Circuit had
brought uniformity to patent doctrine, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 74 (1989).
153. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994).
154. Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En
Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 738–39 (2011) (comparing the rate of en bancs in Federal
Circuit patent cases only with the rate of en bancs in all cases in the regional circuits).
155. See Cotropia, supra note 150, at 817 (comparing the Federal Circuit with
five regional circuits and concluding that the rate of en bancs in the Federal Circuit is
lower than in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and “essentially the same” as in the Third,
Fifth, and D.C. Circuits).
156. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No.
2012-1014, 2014 WL 667499, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (en banc).
157. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963–66 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub.
nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
158. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013).
159. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc).
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Federal Circuit sitting en banc has changed the law on important matters
such as: the standard for inequitable conduct before the PTO,161 the
standard for inducing patent infringement,162 the standard for
infringement of a design patent,163 and the standard for infringement by
products that have been redesigned after a finding of patent
infringement,164 among others.165 These are not simple “housekeeping”
en bancs, resolving minor doctrinal splits in the court’s case law. If that
were the case, the Federal Circuit’s en banc decisions would enhance
legal uniformity. Instead, many of the court’s en banc cases have
presented no intra-circuit split at all—the court convened en banc simply
to reconsider fundamental questions of patentability and infringement.
Further disrupting doctrinal stability over time is a Supreme Court
increasingly interested in patent cases. Only a decade ago the Federal
Circuit was viewed as “the de facto supreme court of patents.”166 No
more. Patent law is now one of the most robust areas of the Supreme
Court’s docket.167 From the 2001 Term through the 2012 Term (which
concluded in June 2013), the Court by my count has decided twenty-one
Federal Circuit patent cases on the merits and reversed or vacated the
judgment in fourteen of those decisions.168 This reversal or vacatur rate
of 67 percent is only slightly above average for any circuit, as the

160. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc).
161. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
162. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014).
163. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
164. TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
165. E.g., Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc in relevant part) (holding that a statute governing infringement
outside the United States does not apply to method patents); Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
566 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that process terms in
product-by-process claims serve as limitations in determining infringement).
166. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387.
167. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s
Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 63–64 (2013) (noting that, in the past decade, the
Supreme Court has heard far more patent cases than copyright or trademark cases).
168. See infra Appendix. In one opinion, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013), the Supreme Court affirmed in part and
reversed in part. I have counted that opinion as a reversal. It should also be noted that one
of the Supreme Court’s affirmances rejected the legal standard that had been adopted by
the Federal Circuit, see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), and that in Gunn v.
Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013), the Supreme Court rejected a long line of Federal Circuit
case law, although the case on certiorari was from the Texas Supreme Court.
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Supreme Court reverses or vacates the lower court in roughly 63 percent
of its decisions on the merits.169
But it is not only the reversal rate that undermines doctrinal stability
in patent law. The issues the Supreme Court has considered, like the
issues considered by the Federal Circuit en banc, address fundamental
matters of patent doctrine, such as patentable subject matter
(repeatedly),170 nonobviousness,171 and infringement,172 as well as
important issues in patent litigation, such as declaratory-judgment
standing,173 the standard of proof for infringement,174 and remedies for
patent holders.175 For most areas of law, one might say that frequent
Supreme Court review actually enhances uniformity because a primary
purpose of certiorari jurisdiction is to resolve circuit splits.176 The patent
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court, however, rarely involve circuit
splits, due to the centralization of appeals in the Federal Circuit.
Moreover, Supreme Court involvement in patent law arguably
encourages further disuniformity in the Federal Circuit, for the Court has
often articulated legal rules that increase the discretion available to lower
court judges.177
My objective thus far has been to test the assumption that exclusive
federal patent jurisdiction, coupled with the centralization of appeals in
the Federal Circuit, provides legal uniformity. I have tried to show that
some legal disuniformity exists as evidenced by, among other things,
divergent judicial approaches to claim construction, high rates of dissent
in Federal Circuit patent cases, and frequent changes to important
principles of patent law, both by the Federal Circuit sitting en banc and

169. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 270–71 tbl.3-6 (5th ed. 2012) (providing data from
October Terms 1946 through 2009).
170. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, No. 13-298 (U.S. 2014); Myriad, 133 S. Ct.
at 2011–13; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
171. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2007).
172. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., No. 12-786 (U.S. 2014);
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737 (2002).
173. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 120–21 (2007).
174. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846
(2014); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
175. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
176. See SUP. CT. R. 10.
177. See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 151, at 19–20. According to
Rantanen and Petherbridge, the Supreme Court has increased discretion on the Federal
Circuit both by articulating rules that explicitly create space for discretion, as on the
issues of nonobviousness and remedies for infringement, and by issuing opinions that
conflict or are difficult to reconcile, as on the issue of patentable subject matter. See id. at
18–20.
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by the Supreme Court.178 Whatever the precise quantity of disuniformity
and whatever that quantity might be relative to any alternative
jurisdictional regime, the disuniformity that exists casts doubt on the
assumption that exclusive federal patent jurisdiction provides legal
uniformity.
2. LEGAL UNIFORMITY AT THE TRIAL LEVEL
Even if patent law lacks uniformity at the appellate level, one might
still defend exclusive federal jurisdiction by claiming that the federal
district courts provide legal uniformity. Although some might doubt
whether ninety-four district courts and hundreds of district judges can
provide legal uniformity, in practice, patent cases tend to cluster in a
small number of districts before a small number of judges. In 2012, for
instance, over half of all patent cases nationwide were filed in just five
districts.179 And two districts, the Eastern District of Texas and the
District of Delaware, accounted for over one-third of all patent cases.180
Furthermore, the Patent Pilot Program, which includes four of the five
districts with the heaviest dockets of patent cases,181 could cause even
greater centralization of patent cases among district judges and, in
theory, enhance the capability of the district courts to articulate and apply
patent law in a uniform manner.182
178. For another analysis concluding that the Federal Circuit has not achieved
the “goal of uniformity” set by its architects, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation,
Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L.
REV. 505, 519–20 (2013).
179. In 2012, 5189 patent cases were filed in the district courts. The five districts
with the most patent cases were: the Eastern District of Texas (1,061), the District of
Delaware (809), the Central District of California (453), the Northern District of Illinois
(275), and the Northern District of California (265). ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR tbl.C-7 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 JUDICIAL BUSINESS].
180. Id. Patent trial experience is also centralized in a small number of district
courts, as just five districts held over 40 percent of all patent trials from 2000 through
2011. Mark A. Lemley et al., Rush to Judgment? Trial Length and Outcomes in Patent
Cases, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 169, 178 (2013). Those districts were: the Eastern District of
Texas, the District of Delaware, the Northern District of California, the Central District of
California, and the District of Massachusetts. Id.
181. The District of Delaware will not participate. See District Courts Selected
for Patent Pilot Program, supra note 70.
182. On whether the Patent Pilot Program is in fact centralizing patent cases
before a smaller number of judges, see Mark A. Lemley et al., Does Familiarity Breed
Contempt among Judges Deciding Patent Cases? 10–11 (2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2347712, which reports that in the Southern District
of New York, judges not participating in the program declined only 14 out of the 143
patent cases they were assigned during the program’s first year and that in the Northern
District of California no judge declined a patent case.
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Yet even this de facto centralization of patent cases does not
automatically lead to legal uniformity. To begin with, not all federal
patent litigation occurs in the federal district courts. Patent holders may
also ask the ITC, an independent federal agency, to prohibit the
importation of goods that infringe their patents. Importantly, patent
holders need not choose between proceeding in a district court and
proceeding in the ITC. Patent cases can—and often do—proceed
simultaneously in both forums.183
This dual-track system undermines legal uniformity in many ways.
For example, procedural rules are much different in the ITC than in the
district courts. Patent litigation in the district courts is governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, proceeds in the familiar adversarial
fashion, and culminates in a jury trial (unless the parties waive their right
to a jury).184 By contrast, ITC cases are technically government
investigations led by a staff attorney from the ITC’s Office of Unfair
Import Investigations.185 Discovery in ITC investigations is quick, and
the primary trial-like proceeding to determine patent validity and
infringement is an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge
(ALJ) conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act.186 The ALJ’s determination is then subject to review by the
six-member ITC and, ultimately, by the President, who may overturn the
ITC’s decision.187
183. See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of
the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 538–40 (2009).
184. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not govern all aspects of patent
litigation in the district courts. In the AIA, Congress abrogated the joinder provision of
Rule 20 in patent cases, providing, among other things, that accused infringers could not
be joined in one case based solely on allegations that they each infringed the same patent.
35 U.S.C. § 299(b) (2012). The rules of the ITC, however, contain no analogous
limitation on joinder. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.12(a)(4), (a)(9)(viii) (2012) (requiring only that
the complaint “[s]tate the name, address, and nature of the business (when such nature is
known) of each person alleged to be” infringing and include “[a] showing that each
person named . . . is importing or selling [an] article covered by, or produced under [a]
process covered by” a U.S. patent).
185. See Kumar, supra note 183, at 536.
186. See id.
187. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j) (2012) (permitting the President to overturn an ITC
decision for “policy reasons”). The President has delegated to the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) the authority to overturn ITC exclusion orders. See Assignment
of Certain Functions Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,251
(July 21, 2005). In August 2013, the USTR overturned an ITC exclusion order that would
have prohibited Apple from importing older-model iPhones and iPads, see Letter from
Ambassador Michael B.G. Froman, U.S. Trade Rep., to Hon. Irving A. Williamson,
Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF, marking the first time since 1987 a
presidential administration overturned an ITC decision, see Brian X. Chen, Obama
Administration Overturns Ban on Apple Products, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2013, 4:34 PM),
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In addition to the significant differences in procedural law, the law
governing the crucial issue of remedies for patent infringement differs
between the ITC and the district courts. Although the ITC cannot award
damages, it has become an increasingly popular forum for patent cases
because it issues exclusion orders almost automatically upon a finding of
infringement.188 In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has limited the
ability of district courts to enjoin future infringement when the plaintiff
does not practice the patented technology.189
Setting aside the disuniformity caused by the concurrent jurisdiction
of the district courts and the ITC, legal disuniformity also exists among
the district courts. To begin with, there is substantial evidence that patent
holders are more likely to win in certain judicial districts than in others.
For instance, in a 2001 study of the ten districts with the largest dockets
of patent cases, Kimberly Moore found that the percentage of cases won
by the patentee varied from a low of 30 percent (in the District of
Massachusetts) to a high of 68 percent (in the Northern District of
California).190 Studying district-by-district variation more recently, Mark
Lemley examined the thirty-three busiest districts for patent cases and
found that the percentage of cases won by the patentee varied from a low
of 11.5 percent (in the Northern District of Georgia) to a high of 55.1
percent (in the Northern District of Texas).191 In addition, both Moore
and Lemley found substantial variation in the percentage of cases that
make it to trial192—an important consideration because patent
infringement plaintiffs fare particularly well in front of juries.193 Because
different types of patent cases cluster in different districts, it would be
reasonable to expect some variation in patentee win-rates, even if the
district courts articulated and applied patent law in a perfectly uniform

http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/obama-administration-overturns-ban-on-appleproducts.
188. See Kumar, supra note 183, at 565–66.
189. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390–91 (2006)
(overturning the “general rule” that a patent holder who prevailed in a district court on a
claim of infringement was automatically entitled to an injunction prohibiting sales of the
infringing product). Since eBay, district courts have granted about 75 percent of requests
for injunctions, down from 95 percent before the Court’s ruling. Colleen V. Chien &
Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
9–10 (2012).
190. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic
Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 917 (2001).
191. Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401,
407–09 (2010).
192. See id. at 411–13; Moore, supra note 190, at 911.
193. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek
Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 406 (2000).
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fashion.194 But the size of the spreads observed raises questions about the
claim that exclusive federal jurisdiction provides legal uniformity in the
district courts.
Turning away from win-rates as a proxy for legal uniformity, there
is also direct evidence of legal disuniformity in the district courts.
Although it is not possible in this space to fully analyze patent doctrine
among all of the district courts, a proliferation of local rules of patent
procedure has introduced significant legal heterogeneity at the trial
level.195 In 2001, the Northern District of California became the first
district to adopt special local rules for patent cases.196 Today, more than
twenty districts have local patent rules.197 Those rules often recite the
objective of providing uniform procedural law for patent cases.198
Although the rules may provide standardization within a particular
district,199 they also undermine the nationwide uniformity of procedural
law that could justify exclusive federal jurisdiction.
To begin with, not all districts with heavy dockets of patent cases
have local patent rules. Districts without patent rules include the District
of Delaware, the Central District of California, the Western District of
Wisconsin, and the Eastern District of Virginia.200 Although cases in
those districts are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
patent cases are also handled according to the individual judges’ standing
orders and personal practices, which can differ substantially from one
judge to another. For example, there is wide disagreement among district
judges about whether to bifurcate the trial on liability for patent
infringement from the trial on damages.201
194. On the difficulties of drawing inferences from win-rate data, see Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything about the
Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 587–92
(1998).
195. I thank Megan La Belle and Jonas Anderson for helpful conversations about
their on-going research into local patent rules. Those conversations have significantly
aided my analysis in this part of the Article.
196. Arthur Gollwitzer III, Local Patent Rules—Certainty and Efficiency or a
Crazy Quilt of Substantive Law?, 13 ENGAGE 94, 94 (2012).
197. See LOCAL PATENT RULES, http://www.localpatentrules.com (last updated
Dec. 2013).
198. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. LOCAL PATENT R. pmbl. (“These Local Patent Rules
provide a standard structure for patent cases that will permit greater predictability and
planning for the Court and the litigants.”).
199. See, e.g., D. MINN. LOCAL R., at xvi–xvii 2005 Patent Advisory
Committee’s Preface (stating that one objective of the district’s local patent rules is to
“[p]romot[e] consistency and certainty in how patent cases are handled in Minnesota”
(emphasis added)).
200. See LOCAL PATENT RULES, supra note 197.
201. Judge Sue Robinson of the District of Delaware, for instance, orders
bifurcation “in all but exceptional patent cases.” Dutch Branch of Streamserve Dev. AB v.
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Even in districts that have local rules, judges do not follow those
rules in every case. Many local patent rules expressly authorize the judge
to modify the rules on a case-by-case basis,202 and it is not uncommon for
judges to deploy that authority. Indeed, certain judges have made a
practice of deviating from their local rules in particular types of cases,
such as when the plaintiff has sued a large number of defendants.203
Moreover, although many local patent rules are based on the rules
first adopted in the Northern District of California, there remain
significant differences from district to district.204 For instance, most local
rules require early disclosure of infringement and validity contentions. A
common deadline for submitting infringement contentions is fourteen
days after the initial case management conference.205 But the deadline is
longer in some districts,206 and the Eastern District of Texas requires
submission of infringement contentions before the case management
conference.207 Under the various local rules, the parties must exchange
invalidity contentions anywhere from fourteen to sixty days after
exchanging infringement contentions.208 Some courts allow parties to

Exstream Software, LLC, Civ. No. 08-343-SLR, slip. op. at 1 (D. Del. Aug. 26, 2009).
Other judges, however, will order bifurcation only in exceptional cases. See Baratta v.
Homeland Housewares, LLC, No. 05-60187-CIV, slip op. at 8 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2008)
(Marra, J.) (“The Court finds that this is not an exceptional case that warrants bifurcation
of liability and damages.” (citing similar cases)); see also Bifurcation Ruling Highlights
Divergent Approaches to Patent Case Management, DOCKET REPORT (Aug. 31, 2009),
http://docketreport.blogspot.com/2009/08/bifurcation-ruling-highlights-divergent.html
(discussing the “widely-divergent spectrum” of approaches to bifurcation).
202. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT LOCAL R. 1-3; N.D. ILL. LOCAL PATENT R. 1.1.
203. Judge Leonard Davis of the Eastern District of Texas, for example,
regularly deviates from the discovery deadlines in the local patent rules in those types of
cases. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., No. 6:10-CV-373, 2011 WL 1980214,
at *1 (E.D. Tex. May 20, 2011) (“The Court has previously expressed concern about
cases where a plaintiff asserts questionable patent claims against a large number of
Defendants to extract cost of defense settlements. . . . In those situations the Patent Rules,
with their quick discovery deadlines, may not provide the most efficient case
management schedule . . . .”), cited in Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some)
Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2252849.
204. The fragmentation is severe enough to justify a website,
localpatentrules.com, cataloging the differences among the districts’ rules. The author of
the site warns that “patent rules sometimes vary significantly from district to district” and
that “patent rules have a significant impact on the timing (and sometimes even the
outcome) of a case.” Travis Jensen, About the Author, LOCAL PATENT RULES,
http://www.localpatentrules.com/about-the-author (last updated Dec. 2013).
205. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. LOCAL PATENT R. 3-1.
206. See, e.g., W.D. PA. LOCAL PATENT R. 3-2 (thirty days).
207. E.D. TEX. PATENT R. 3-1.
208. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. LOCAL PATENT R. 2.3 (fourteen days); S.D. CAL. PATENT
LOCAL R. 3.3 (sixty days).
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serve a second or “final” set of contentions after discovery,209 but others
permit amendment of initial contentions only on “a timely showing of
good cause.”210 In addition, districts with patent rules are split on
whether claim construction briefing proceeds in parallel (with the parties
simultaneously exchanging briefs) or is sequential.211 Moreover, the
rapid timeline for contention disclosures under some local rules contrasts
with the months or even years that a litigant in a court without local rules
might have to develop its theories of infringement and validity.
Although local rules are required to be “consistent with” the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,212 some local patent rules arguably conflict
with the federal rules, further undermining legal uniformity. The patent
rules of the District of New Hampshire, for example, impose a
heightened pleading standard for patent cases, requiring that the
complaint provide “a list of all products or processes (by model number,
trade name, or other specific identifying characteristic)” that are alleged
to infringe.213 By contrast, the Federal Circuit has held that a plaintiff can
satisfy Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs
the content of a complaint, even if it “cannot point to the specific device
or product” that allegedly infringes.214 The New Hampshire local rules
also require the complaint to recite “at least one illustrative asserted
patent claim (per asserted patent) for each accused product or
process.”215 The Federal Circuit, however, has held that a plaintiff can
satisfy Rule 8(a) by simply identifying the patent it asserts and
describing how the defendant allegedly infringes it—without referring to
the patent’s claims.216 In contrast to the heightened pleading requirement
209. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. LOCAL PATENT R. 3.1–3.2; see also E.D. TEX. PATENT R.
3-6 (permitting amendment of contentions after claim construction ruling).
210. E.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT LOCAL R. 3-6; D.N.J. LOCAL PATENT R. 3.7.
211. See Travis Jensen, Claim Construction, LOCAL PATENT RULES,
http://www.localpatentrules.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Chart%20Claim%
20Construction.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). Among the districts that mandate
sequential briefing, there is even further fragmentation. The Northern District of Illinois,
for example, requires that the accused infringer file the opening brief, N.D. ILL. LOCAL
PATENT R. 4.2, but, according to one observer, the patent holder must file the opening
brief in all other districts that use sequential briefing, see Grace Pak, Balkanization of the
Local Patent Rules and a Proposal to Balance Uniformity and Local Experimentation,
2 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 44, 51 (2011).
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
213. D.N.H. SUPP. PATENT R. 2.1(a)(1).
214. See K-Tech Telecomm., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277,
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
215. D.N.H. SUPP. PATENT R. 2.1(a)(2).
216. See Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 790,
794 (Fed Cir. 2000) (denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim where the
“complaint alleges ownership of the asserted patent, names each individual defendant,
cites the patent that is allegedly infringed, describes the means by which the defendants
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imposed by the New Hampshire rules, other districts have allowed patent
holders to proceed with sparsely pled claims by noting the early
disclosure of infringement and validity contentions required by their
local rules.217
To be clear, local patent rules may still be normatively desirable on
balance, even if they introduce fragmentation.218 But the justification for
exclusive federal jurisdiction should not rely so heavily on the premise
that the district courts provide legal uniformity.219 Rather, there are more
practical features of the federal district courts that support exclusive
patent jurisdiction. For example, the reason that local patent rules may be
desirable is not that they are uniform—they are not—but that they make
patent litigation more efficient.220 Moreover, federal statutes and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain numerous mechanisms that
make complex litigation that crosses state borders, as patent cases often
do, more efficient than it would be in state court. For example, related
cases filed in different federal districts can be consolidated for pretrial
proceedings,221 and federal cases can be transferred from one district to
another for the convenience of the parties and witnesses.222 Although one
could connect those useful mechanisms to the uniformity of procedural
law in the federal courts, the more fundamental reason those mechanisms
justify exclusive federal patent jurisdiction is that they enhance the
efficiency of inter-state litigation.
C. Is Legal Uniformity a Desirable Policy Aim?
Even if both substantive patent law and the procedural law that
applies to patent cases is not uniform, that disuniformity might
reasonably be praised as desirable “percolation” because patent law, with
allegedly infringe, and points to the specific sections of the patent law invoked”); accord
McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
217. See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 921, 938 (N.D. Ill.
2010) (“In analogous cases, other district courts have concluded that local patent rules
requiring [early] disclosures militate against dismissal of counterclaims for failure to
meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).”).
218. See Pak, supra note 211, at 51 (stating that “[t]he patent community widely
regards the local patent rules . . . as positive”).
219. For another analysis “debunk[ing] the myth that the Federal Circuit has
mostly eliminated nonuniformity across the various district courts,” see Ted Sichelman,
Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2010).
220. See infra text accompanying note 288.
221. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
222. Id. § 1404(a); see also David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A
Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 328 (1977) (summarizing the procedural
advantages of federal courts over state courts in cases involving citizens of multiple
states).
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appeals consolidated in the Federal Circuit, lacks the intercircuit dialogue
found in other areas of federal law.223 But praising percolation undercuts
a foundational normative assumption of exclusive federal jurisdiction:
that legal uniformity is a desirable policy aim. Indeed, legal uniformity
may not be as critical to the patent system as is assumed.
When legal rules vary from state to state, this heterogeneity is often
lauded as experimentation.224 In this vein, some scholars have already
questioned the value of patent law uniformity. Craig Nard and John
Duffy, for example, have proposed repealing the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive jurisdiction and instead having multiple courts of appeals share
jurisdiction over patent cases.225 Interestingly, many of the benefits that
Nard and Duffy argue would flow from a pluralistic model of appellate
jurisdiction map onto a model of concurrent state-federal trial
jurisdiction.
To start, concurrent jurisdiction could encourage interjurisdictional
dialogue and experimentation.226 Although not beyond doubt, most state
courts would probably determine that they are not required to follow the
case law of lower federal courts such as the Federal Circuit.227 Of course,
state courts would likely follow Federal Circuit precedent on routine
matters of patent law, and even on more difficult issues, state courts
might simply cite the “expert” Federal Circuit without engaging in any
real analysis.228 But it would not be unprecedented for state judges to
223. See, e.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657,
662–63 (2009); Petherbridge, supra note 149, at 428–29; Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra
note 151, at 12–13.
224. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1595
(2008).
225. Nard & Duffy, supra note 86, at 1623–24.
226. Id. at 1653.
227. See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 31
(2006) (noting that “the question of whether state courts are bound by lower federal
courts on . . . federal law’s content remains open” but arguing that “[t]he better view—
mainly trying to effectuate the constitutional status of state courts, while accepting some
local disuniformity in the short term—is that the state court should try to determine what
the U.S. Supreme Court would rule” (footnotes omitted)).
228. Cf. Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity
in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 309 (2003) (arguing that state
courts deciding patent matters “should apply Federal Circuit law for all substantive patent
law issues and procedural law issues unique to patents”). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has
urged other federal courts of appeals to defer to its law on patent-related antitrust issues
to “preserv[e] the uniformity of the patent law without regard to the appellate forum.”
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1355 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006). And the Eighth Circuit “adopt[ed] the
Federal Circuit’s precedent on substantive issues of patent law” in a pre-AIA case
involving counterclaims of patent invalidity and noninfringement. Schinzing v.
Mid-States Stainless, Inc., 415 F.3d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 2005).
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question Federal Circuit case law. Before the Supreme Court decided
Gunn, for instance, some state courts and state judges criticized or
ignored the Federal Circuit’s expansive conception of federal
jurisdiction,229 and others drew strained factual distinctions to avoid
federal jurisdiction.230
One objection to concurrent jurisdiction would be that legal
disuniformity would harm the patent system and the innovators who rely
upon it. Even if the current regime does not provide perfect legal
uniformity, the argument would go, any uniformity is helpful because
patents have nationwide effect and businesses must make investment
decisions in reliance on their patent rights. Yet, as Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette has recently observed, there is a long-standing and unsettled
debate about whether our current patent system actually promotes
innovation.231 Without proof that patent law improves social welfare, it
may be unwise to lock every jurisdiction into the same legal regime.232
Instead, Ouellette advocates for an experimentalist approach under which
courts would be encouraged to adopt different rules of patent law and
varied procedural approaches toward patent litigation, with the goal of
generating knowledge about the consequences of alternative regimes.233
From a practical standpoint, any disuniformity caused by concurrent
jurisdiction would not make patent doctrine overly complex to
administer and apply. State court decisions on matters of patent law
would have no precedential effect in the federal courts, the PTO, or the

229. For example, in New Tek Manufacturing, Inc. v. Beehner, 751 N.W.2d 135
(Neb. 2008), the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected a patent malpractice claim because, in
its view, the plaintiff’s underlying claim of patent infringement would have failed. Id. at
139, 144, 151. The court had requested and received supplemental briefing on the Federal
Circuit’s then-recent holding that malpractice cases involving embedded issues of patent
infringement give rise to exclusive federal jurisdiction, id. at 144 (citing Air
Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262
(Fed. Cir. 2007)), and the Nebraska court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction was plainly at
odds with that holding. See Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271. For an example of a state
judge explicitly criticizing the Federal Circuit, see Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 652
(Tex. 2011) (Guzman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has not remained faithful to
the Supreme Court’s federalism inquiry in the context of malpractice decisions arising
from patent cases.”).
230. See, e.g., E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. Moses & Singer, LLP, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d
516, 523–24, 526 (Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting federal jurisdiction because the plaintiff
would not have to “prove what the proper outcome of the federal [patent] litigation
should have been” but only that “there was no reasonable possibility of prevailing” in the
federal patent litigation).
231. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 7–13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294774.
232. Id. at 13–15.
233. Id. at 33–35.
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ITC, so federal patent law would remain as uniform as it is today.234 If,
as with other areas of concurrent jurisdiction, defendants retained the
right to remove a case filed in state court to federal court, the parties
would always be able to choose the federal forum with its potentially
more uniform law.
There is, of course, a rich literature debating the merits of legal
uniformity more broadly.235 But my points here are simple: it is not clear
that uniformity in patent law provides a social benefit, and any
disuniformity introduced by concurrent jurisdiction would not present
insurmountable obstacles to administering the patent system.
D. Exclusive Jurisdiction and Adjudicative Uniformity
To this point, the discussion of uniformity has focused mainly on
the uniformity of substantive patent law and of procedural law in patent
cases. As noted, however, there is a second dimension of uniformity—
adjudicative uniformity—which reflects the notions that a particular
patent should be construed similarly from one case to another and that
courts should not reach inconsistent validity findings regarding the same
patent. Does exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent cases provide the
adjudicative uniformity that could justify prohibiting state courts from
hearing patent cases?
Adjudicative uniformity has regularly been invoked as a policy aim
by the Federal Circuit. For example, in holding that district court claim
construction is subject to de novo review, the court emphasized that its
“role in providing national uniformity to the construction of a patent
claim . . . would be impeded” by a more deferential standard.236 And
when the court suggested that much of its jurisdictional case law, which
embraced a broad scope of exclusive federal jurisdiction over state law
claims, “may well have survived” Gunn, the court emphasized that state
234. Because the federal patent statute would be unaffected by a switch to
concurrent jurisdiction, the switch would be unlikely to violate the United States’
obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81. Indeed, the TRIPS agreement states that it
is satisfied so long as courts of general jurisdiction are open to patent claims. See id. art.
41.5 (noting that the agreement “does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial
system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the
enforcement of law in general”).
235. For two notable examples, compare Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A
Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 699 n.68 (1984) (outlining the benefits of legal percolation), with
Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 689–91
(1990) (arguing that “the virtues of percolation have been wildly exaggerated”).
236. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(en banc).
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court adjudication of patent-related cases “could result in inconsistent
judgments between state and federal courts.”237
The rules articulated by the Federal Circuit to foster adjudicative
uniformity have proven controversial. The Supreme Court in Gunn
overruled a line of Federal Circuit jurisdictional cases,238 and a deeply
divided en banc Federal Circuit recently reaffirmed the de novo standard
for reviewing district court claim construction, despite significant
criticism of that rule by commentators and the court’s own judges.239 The
controversial nature of these doctrines suggests that institutional design
principles, expressed through standards of appellate review and doctrines
of jurisdiction, might not be the optimal mechanisms for pursuing
adjudicative uniformity.
Rather, adjudicative uniformity might be promoted adequately and
more efficiently by doctrines of preclusion. A few examples will help
illustrate why that is so. Suppose Patentee sues Defendant 1 in District
Court A, and District Court A rules in favor of Defendant 1, finding that
the patent is invalid.240 If Patentee later sues Defendant 2 in District
Court B for infringing the same patent, Defendant 2 will be able to
invoke the invalidity judgment of District Court A to preclude Patentee’s
suit.241 This result promotes adjudicative uniformity, as District Courts A
and B will have both concluded the patent is invalid. It also seems fair, as
Patentee had a full opportunity to defend the patent’s validity in District
Court A.
Now suppose instead that District Court A ruled in Patentee’s favor,
finding the patent valid and infringed by Defendant 1. In that scenario,
Patentee likely cannot use the prior judgment offensively to preclude
Defendant 2 from litigating the patent’s validity in District Court B.242
This result does not necessarily foster adjudicative uniformity, although
it is certainly possible that District Court B will, like District Court A,
find the patent valid and infringed. Indeed, any written opinion by

237. Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 715 F.3d 1329,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
238. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013).
239. See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No.
2012-2014, 2014 WL 6677499, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014); see also Gugliuzza, supra
note 85, at 1833 n.20 (collecting commentary and judicial opinions criticizing de novo
review).
240. The hypotheticals in this and the following two paragraphs draw on the
thoughtful examples in Nard & Duffy, supra note 86, at 1670–72.
241. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
330–50 (1971).
242. See Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 710–11 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
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District Court A might influence District Court B. But it only seems fair
to allow Defendant 2 to litigate for itself the defense of patent invalidity.
Preclusion issues in claim construction work largely the same
way:243 Defendant 2 would likely be able to bind Patentee to the claim
construction from the earlier case, but Patentee probably could not bind
Defendant 2 to a claim construction from the earlier case to which
Defendant 2 was not a party. These existing rules of issue preclusion
provide a reasonable compromise between having a patent uniformly
adjudicated and the parties’ personal rights to fully litigate their legal
claims and defenses.244
Although preclusion doctrine provides a reasonable level of
adjudicative uniformity, it is not a perfect substitute for exclusive federal
jurisdiction. The examples above all employed federal preclusion law,
which contains some well-established principles for patent cases. Most
importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation245 held that a judgment that a
patent is invalid may be asserted defensively by parties accused of
infringing the same patent in the future.246 By rejecting the so-called
mutuality requirement, under which persons who were not parties to the
prior litigation were unable to rely on the prior judgment, the Court
established a rule that once a federal court determines a patent is invalid,
that patent is invalid throughout the country.247
That would not necessarily be the case if the prior judgment was
issued by a state court. Under choice-of-law rules, the preclusive effect
of a judgment is usually determined by the law of the court that issued
it.248 Thus, the preclusive effect of a judgment issued by, say, a Florida
state court, would be determined by Florida preclusion law. Many states’
preclusion laws are consistent with Blonder-Tongue and other aspects of
federal preclusion law, which is itself shaped by the influential
243. See generally Nard & Duffy, supra note 86, at 1670–72.
244. This compromise, it should be noted, is somewhat disrupted by the Federal
Circuit’s holding that patent decisions by the ITC are not entitled to preclusive effect in
subsequent district court litigation. See Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
851 F.2d 342, 344 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing
Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of International Trade Commission
Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH., 457, 481 (2008) (discussing cases in which the ITC
and district courts reached conflicting results); Kumar, supra note 183, at 563 (criticizing
this rule).
245. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
246. Id. at 350.
247. See generally id.
248. See 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 124, §§ 4467, 4469; see also Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984) (“It is now settled that a
federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be
given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.”).
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Restatement (Second) of Judgments.249 But state courts are under no
obligation to follow federal preclusion law, and several states specifically
retain the mutuality requirement rejected in Blonder-Tongue.250 So, for
example, if a patent holder filed an infringement suit in Florida state
court and lost based on a finding of patent invalidity, that patent holder
could potentially pursue a subsequent infringement suit against an
infringer of the same patent because Florida retains a mutuality
requirement.251 Therefore, the predictable preclusive effects of a federal
judgment provide a persuasive, pragmatic justification for exclusive
federal patent jurisdiction. That said, although a mutuality requirement
remains on the books in some states, there is a clear trend away from
mutuality,252 and a court determining the preclusive effects of a state
court patent judgment might follow Blonder-Tongue even if there is state
precedent to the contrary.253 So the case for exclusive jurisdiction based
on preclusion concerns should not be overstated.

249. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 124, § 4401 n.2.
250. See, e.g., Jones v. Blanton, 644 So. 2d 882, 886 (Ala. 1994); E.C. v. Katz,
731 So. 2d 1268, 1269–70 (Fla. 1999); Lichon v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d
288, 298 (Mich. 1990); Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380,
385–86 (N.D. 1992); see also Farred v. Hicks, 915 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990)
(applying Georgia law).
251. See Katz, 731 So. 2d at 1270.
252. See Steven P. Nonkes, Note, Reducing the Unfair Effects of Nonmutual
Issue Preclusion through Damages Limits, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1464–68 (2009).
253. For example, in Beckett ex rel. Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. United States, 217
F.R.D. 541 (D. Kan. 2003), the federal district court noted that “Kansas has previously
held to the [mutuality] requirement.” Id. at 543 (citing Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Ins.
Agency, 498 P.2d 265, 273 (Kan. 1972)). The court observed, however, that one federal
judge in 1976 had “predicted that, under the right circumstances, the Kansas Supreme
Court would relax its mutuality requirement” and that this prediction “has been routinely
followed by the federal courts in this district ever since.” Id. at 543–44 (citing Crutsinger
v. Hess, 408 F. Supp. 548, 554 (D. Kan. 1976), and additional cases); see also Lichon,
459 N.W.2d at 298 n.16 (noting “that lack of mutuality does not always preclude the
application of collateral estoppel” because “[t]here are several well-established
exceptions to the mutuality requirement”); cf. Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 880 n.10
(11th Cir. 2003) (noting that Alabama law on mutuality “is somewhat unclear”); Farred,
915 F.2d at 1533 (noting that Georgia law on mutuality is “unsettled”). On the propriety
of a federal court ignoring a state supreme court holding on a matter of state law, see 19
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 124, § 4507 (“Even if, in the considered judgment of the
federal court . . . , the rule of law that was announced by the forum state’s highest court is
anomalous, antiquated, or simply unwise, it must be followed by the federal court . . .
unless there are very persuasive grounds for believing that the state’s highest court no
longer would adhere to the previously announced principle.” (footnote omitted) (citing
cases)).
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E. Exclusive Jurisdiction and Expertise
The patent expertise justification for exclusive federal jurisdiction is
in one sense a tautology. Under a long-standing regime of exclusive
jurisdiction, only the federal courts can hear patent cases and develop
expertise. In any event, most judicial experience in patent cases resides
on the federal bench, both on the federal district courts and the Federal
Circuit. Although the patent expertise provided by those institutions
provides a modest case in support of exclusive federal jurisdiction, a
stronger case can be constructed by also acknowledging the case
management expertise provided by the federal district courts.
Examining the district courts first, it seems that any patent expertise
on that bench provides an efficiency benefit. Jay Kesan and Gwendolyn
Ball, for example, have shown that the average patent case is terminated
about 10 percent more quickly when it is heard by a judge experienced in
patent cases.254 This finding makes sense because patent litigation is
complex and requires specialized procedures, such as Markman hearings
to determine claim construction,255 that dictate other important aspects of
the case, such as summary judgment practice and jury instructions. Yet
the efficiency of patent-experienced federal judges does not necessarily
support a regime in which patent cases may be filed in any federal court
nationwide because few district judges have significant preappointment
exposure to patent law and only a small number of judges in a small
number of districts obtain significant patent experience on the bench.256

254. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency
and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a
Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 394, 428 (2011). In this
discussion, I use the terms expertise and experience in their colloquial sense, with patent
expertise flowing from extensive experience in patent cases. See Expert,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/expert
(last
visited Mar. 6, 2014) (“having, involving, or displaying special skill or knowledge
derived from training or experience” (emphasis added)). It should be noted, however, that
some scholars have distinguished the two concepts and have shown that expertise in
patent law (defined as having a technical degree and being a member of the patent bar) is
predictive of the decision making of Federal Circuit judges, while accumulated
experience (through repeated exposure to patent cases as a judge) is not. See Banks
Miller & Brett Curry, Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The
Case of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 839,
858 (2009); Banks Miller & Brett Curry, Experts Judging Experts: The Role of Expertise
in Reviewing Agency Decision Making, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 55, 59–60 (2013).
255. The Markman hearing derives its name from the case in which the Federal
Circuit and Supreme Court decided that claim construction was a matter for the judge,
not the jury, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
256. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 254, at 420–22, 447 tbl.3 (noting that, from
1995 through 2003, 20 percent of all federal district judges heard 60 percent of federal

56

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Rather, the federal district courts’ clustered patent experience suggests
that patent cases should be limited to a smaller number of districts and
judges, as is tentatively being attempted through the Pilot Program.
Although funneling patent cases to patent-experienced district
judges seems to further judicial efficiency, it is less clear that patent
experience improves the accuracy of case outcomes, at least as measured
by the imperfect proxy of appellate reversal rates.257 David Schwartz, for
example, has shown that judges who have handled hundreds of patent
cases are just as likely to have their claim constructions reversed by the
Federal Circuit as judges who have handled few patent cases.258 By
contrast, Kesan and Ball studied a broader cross-section of issues that
arise in patent cases and concluded that judges with substantial
experience in patent cases have lower average reversal rates than judges
with little experience in patent cases.259 They also note, however, that
this variation may be caused by factors besides experience, including
simple randomness.260
Because of exclusive federal patent jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit
is the sole appellate forum for patent cases, and that court, of course,
provides significant patent expertise. Although the court hears cases
involving many different areas of federal law, including not just patents
but also veterans benefits, government employment disputes, and many
others, the judges who have served on the court mostly have
backgrounds in the commerce-related areas of the court’s jurisdiction,
particularly patents and international trade.261 Moreover, even a judge
without a background in patent law can develop some patent expertise
(as I use the term)262 by simply sitting on the Federal Circuit and
patent cases, and that 40 percent of district judges heard, on average, one patent case per
year).
257. On the shortcomings of judging the quality of lower court decisions by
reversal rates, see Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources
and Meaning of Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 981, 1003 (2010).
258. Schwartz, supra note 151, at 255–56; see also David L. Schwartz, Courting
Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation
before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1699, 1702–04 (2009) (finding that the Federal Circuit reverses the claim
construction decisions of the ITC’s administrative law judges, who are also viewed as
patent experts, at about the same rate it reverses claim constructions of district courts
with significant patent dockets).
259. Kesan & Ball, supra note 254, at 438.
260. Id.
261. See Gugliuzza, supra note 10, at 1468–69; see also Judges, U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/randall-r-raderchief-judge.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (providing biographical information on the
court’s judges).
262. See supra note 254.
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deciding patent cases. Also, the court’s judges tend to hire law clerks
with technical or scientific backgrounds (likely because of their fluency
in patent law),263 and the court obtains input from its technical assistants,
who assist the judges both before and after a case is submitted and who
review precedential opinions before they are published.264 But is the
Federal Circuit’s patent expertise normatively beneficial? Does it
therefore justify the current regime of exclusive federal jurisdiction?
Expert judicial adjudication is often justified by reference to what
Lawrence Baum has called the “neutral virtues” of the uniformity of law,
efficiency of case processing, and quality of decisions.265 As discussed
above, it is questionable whether the relatively expert Federal Circuit has
provided legal uniformity in patent law.266 As for efficiency, although
some Federal Circuit judges have bragged that their court is “quicker to
hear arguments and issue decisions than most circuit courts,”267 it is not
entirely clear that the data supports that assertion. In 2012, for example,
the median time interval from filing the notice of appeal to disposition in
the regional circuits was 9.8 months,268 while in the Federal Circuit the
median time interval from docketing to disposition was 9.9 months.269
That said, there are such significant differences between the
caseloads of the regional circuits and the Federal Circuit that it is
difficult to meaningfully compare the courts’ respective efficiency. On
263. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 18 (2001).
264. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING
PROCEDURES No. 10-5 (2010), available at www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/rulesof-practice/IOPsMaster.pdf (“When all panel votes are in on a precedential opinion or
order, the authoring judge circulates the opinion and any concurring or dissenting
opinions, with a transmittal sheet, to each judge. A copy is also circulated to the senior
technical assistant (STA), and if requested the STA shall provide information on potential
conflicts between the panel-approved opinion and any other prior opinions of the court or
other relevant precedents.”).
265. BAUM, supra note 68, at 4.
266. See supra Part II.B.1.
267. Paul R. Michel, Past, Present, and Future in the Life of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1199, 1206 (2010).
268. 2012 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 179, tbl.B-4.
269. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, MEDIAN TIME TO
DISPOSITION IN CASES TERMINATED AFTER HEARING OR SUBMISSION [hereinafter FEDERAL
CIRCUIT TIME TO DISPOSITION], available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/
Statistics/med%20disp%20time%20merits_table.pdf. Note that docketing, the event from
which the Federal Circuit measures time to disposition, occurs slightly later in the
appellate process than the filing of the notice of appeal, the event from which time to
disposition is measured in the regional circuits. See FED. CIR. R. 3 practice note (“An
appeal is filed when the notice of appeal is received by the trial court. An appeal sent to
this court by the trial court clerk is docketed when it is assigned a docket number, a
docket card for the appeal is made available to the public, and the names of the parties to
the appeal are recorded in the party index that is available to the public.”).
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the one hand, the Federal Circuit has a smaller caseload per judge than
most regional circuits, so one might say that the Federal Circuit ought to
process cases much more quickly than the regional circuits.270 On the
other hand, the cases heard by the Federal Circuit, particularly the patent
cases that comprise nearly half the court’s docket, are more complex than
the average regional circuit case, which might make it remarkable that
the Federal Circuit processes cases at roughly the same speed as its sister
circuits.271 For a more fine-grained analysis, one might compare the time
to disposition by the regional circuits in non-prisoner civil cases (12.2
months)272 with the time to disposition by the Federal Circuit in cases
appealed from the district courts, which should be overwhelmingly if not
exclusively patent cases (11.8 months).273 Although this data suggests
that the Federal Circuit might be slightly more efficient than the regional
circuits, it is far from indisputable evidence in support of the claim that
the patent-expert Federal Circuit enhances the efficiency of appellate
patent litigation.
The last neutral virtue that the expert Federal Circuit (and, therefore,
exclusive federal jurisdiction) might provide is an enhanced quality of
decision making, sometimes referred to as accuracy. Defining what
constitutes a “high quality” or “accurate” judicial decision is difficult and
arguably subjective, particularly in cases close enough to reach a final
judgment on appeal. Rochelle Dreyfuss has provided as useful a
definition as any, suggesting that accuracy should be measured by
whether patent law is “responsive to the philosophy of the Patent Act, to
national competition policies, and to the needs of researchers and
technology users.”274 Many commentators have considered whether the
current patent system, under the guidance of the Federal Circuit, is
serving its purpose of promoting innovation.275 Although this literature is
270. See generally 2012 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 179, tbl.B-1, B-8
(showing that 1381 appeals were filed in the Federal Circuit in 2012, fewer than in any
other circuit except the D.C. Circuit).
271. On the composition of the Federal Circuit’s docket, see U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILED, BY CATEGORY FY 2012,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/Caseload_by_Category_
Appeals_Filed_2012.pdf.
272. 2012 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 179, tbl.B-4A.
273. FEDERAL CIRCUIT TIME TO DISPOSITION, supra note 269. Besides its
jurisdiction over patent appeals from the district courts, the Federal Circuit also has
jurisdiction over appeals in contract actions brought against the federal government under
the “Little” Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (2012). Little Tucker Act cases are
subject to concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims if
the amount in dispute is $10,000 or less. Id. § 1346(a)(2).
274. Dreyfuss, supra note 152, at 5.
275. For a survey of the literature on patent law and innovation, see Ouellette,
supra note 231, at 7–13.
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rich and varied, many commentators believe that the patent system needs
improvement, citing the increasing number of patents of unclear scope
and the growing amount and cost of patent litigation.276 Some
commentators attribute the patent system’s problems to the Federal
Circuit.277 That said, some commentators are more sanguine about the
state of the patent system278 and about the Federal Circuit’s
performance.279 For present purposes, it is not necessary to resolve this
ongoing debate. The salient point is that, based on the current state of
knowledge, the evidence is at best equivocal as to whether the Federal
Circuit’s patent expertise benefits the patent system.
Thus, it is less than compelling to justify the current regime of
nationwide exclusive federal jurisdiction on the patent expertise of
federal judges either at the trial or appellate level. As discussed earlier,
however, there is a second dimension of expertise that the federal
courts—particularly the federal district courts—can provide: case
management expertise.280 This concept refers to the general capability of
a judge or a court to efficiently process complex litigation, patent
litigation included. The case management expertise of the federal district
courts might provide stronger support for a regime of exclusive federal
jurisdiction than patent expertise does. Kesan and Ball, for example,
showed that district judges who have simply spent more time on the
federal bench—regardless of how many patent cases they have heard—
process patent cases more quickly,281 suggesting that seasoned federal
judges might be the best judges to handle patent cases.282
276. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 10–19 (2008).
277. See, e.g., id. at 18; Nard & Duffy, supra note 86, at 1620–21; Diane P.
Wood, Keynote Address, Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive
Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 5–10 (2013).
278. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 753–54 (2001) (arguing that
“disparate features of the existing patent system—previously thought to be unrelated or
mutually antithetical—actually operate together to effectively promote invention
commercialization”). But cf. F. Scott Kieff, Removing Property from Intellectual
Property and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition, 19 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 25, 49–50 (2011) (arguing that recent judicial decisions have reduced the
role of patents “in facilitating the coordination and contracting that can lead to increased
competition and access”).
279. See, e.g., Petherbridge, supra note 149, at 430, 464 (suggesting, based on an
empirical study of Federal Circuit case law on the doctrine of equivalents, that “the court
might . . . be capable of managing a jurisprudential framework that supplies a pipeline of
ideas useful for incrementally advancing the law”).
280. See supra Part I.B.
281. Kesan & Ball, supra note 254, at 450 tbl.V.
282. On how experience with patent cases affects the substance of judicial
decisions, see Lemley et al., supra note 182, at 28, which suggests that judges who have
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More fundamentally, it is difficult to quarrel with the perception that
federal district judges are of higher quality than state trial judges.283
Federal judges are viewed as better at performing the judicial task, they
are better paid, they have law clerks with more impressive credentials,
and they come from more sophisticated practice backgrounds. In his
classic article explaining the preference of civil rights plaintiffs for
federal court, Burt Neuborne suggested that the preference stemmed in
part from the federal courts’ high level of “technical competence.”284
“Stated bluntly,” Neuborne wrote, “federal trial courts tend to be better
equipped to analyze complex, often conflicting lines of authority and
more likely to produce competently written, persuasive opinions than are
state trial courts.”285 Although the preference among civil rights plaintiffs
for federal trial courts has been weakened by decades of conservative
ascendancy on the Supreme Court and lower federal courts,286 the
observations about technical competence still seem to be widely held.287
In addition to the judges themselves, other mechanisms make the
federal courts well equipped to manage patent litigation. As discussed,
many judicial districts have adopted special procedural rules for patent
cases.288 Those rules address the complications of patent cases by
providing default protective orders and by setting timelines for the
parties to submit infringement and validity contentions and for the court
to conduct its Markman hearing. Federal district courts also make
available magistrate judges to mediate discovery disputes (which can be

heard a substantial number of patent cases are more likely to reject a patent holder’s
claim of infringement than judges who have heard few patent cases.
283. See THOMAS B. MARVELL ET AL., COURT SELECTION: STUDENT LITIGATION
IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 15 (1982); POSNER, supra note 15, at 216; Victor E.
Flango, Attorneys’ Perspectives on Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 25 AKRON L.
REV. 41, 81 (1991).
284. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120 (1977).
285. Id.
286. See Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of
Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 798–99 (1995).
287. For survey data on the perceived technical competence of federal district
judges, see, for example, Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis
of a Survey and Implications for Reform, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 749, 755–68 (1980–81)
(empirical study based on a survey of attorneys in diversity-jurisdiction-eligible cases,
concluding that the perceived higher quality of federal judges was an important factor
driving filing decisions); Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal
Cases under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 393,
433 (1992) (empirical study based on a survey of attorneys in cases removed to federal
court, concluding that “[t]he research findings clearly support the view that federal judges
are perceived as superior to state court judges”).
288. See supra Part II.B.2.
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critically important in patent cases), conduct settlement conferences, and
even preside over trials with the consent of the parties.289
If it is accurate to describe federal district courts and district judges
as providing technical competence and case management expertise,
jurisdictional allocation becomes in part a question of distributive
consequences: What types of cases are so important that a “judicial
forum of excellence”—the federal district courts—should be made
available?290 Patent cases may well qualify, as they often have high
financial stakes and involve technology that is widely used by the public.
I return to the issue of distributive consequences later, when addressing
the normative question of whether exclusive jurisdiction should be
abolished.291 For now, the salient point is that the patent expertise
rationale for exclusive jurisdiction might be usefully complemented by a
concern about the respective case management capabilities of state and
federal trial courts.
It is worth noting, however, that those who doubt the capabilities of
state judges might be speaking too broadly. There is wide variation in the
quality of state judges, just as there is variation in the quality of federal
judges.292 For example, there are state trial courts with excellent
reputations for handling complex cases, such as the commercial division
in the New York system, the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the North
Carolina Business Court, among others.293 And while state trial judges
have a low position in the hierarchy of the legal profession,294 state
appellate judges—the judges who would ultimately be shaping patent
doctrine under a regime of concurrent jurisdiction—are relatively well
paid and well regarded.295 Indeed, federal judges are often appointed
from the state appellate judiciaries.
III. RETHINKING EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
So far, this Article has argued that exclusive federal patent
jurisdiction should be justified not by simply citing the tropes of legal
uniformity and patent expertise. Rather, any defense of exclusive
jurisdiction should, at a minimum, also acknowledge that it ensures the
289. See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE
2-72 to 2-73, 4-19 (2d. ed. 2012).
290. See Neuborne, supra note 286, at 797–800; Seinfeld, supra note 17, at 151.
291. See infra Part III.B.
292. See SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 16, at 38; Paul M. Bator, The State
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 629 (1981).
293. See infra Part III.A.
294. See BAUM, supra note 68, at 217.
295. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 16, at 37; Bator, supra note 292, at
629–30.
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uniformity of preclusive effects and provides for patent disputes the case
management expertise of federal district courts. This Part first weighs
this new, pragmatic case for exclusive patent jurisdiction against the
benefits that could flow from concurrent state-federal jurisdiction. It then
considers the consequences of abolishing exclusive federal jurisdiction
and concludes that even if Congress were to change the jurisdictional
statute, most patent cases would still be litigated in a small number of
federal district courts.
A. What State Courts Could Offer
One benefit of concurrent state-federal jurisdiction is that it would
modestly improve judicial economy, especially in state law cases
involving embedded patent issues, such as state law tort claims stemming
from patent-related conduct. Under exclusive jurisdiction, objections to
state court jurisdiction can be raised at any time—even on appeal—and if
the state court lacks jurisdiction, the entire case must be restarted in
federal court.296 Moreover, as discussed above, prevailing doctrine does
not always provide clear guidance on whether a state law claim “arises
under” patent law and is therefore subject to exclusive federal
jurisdiction.297 To recap, the Supreme Court in Gunn v. Minton suggested
that state law claims will rarely arise under federal law, but the Federal
Circuit in Forrester asserted the continuing vitality of much of the
court’s pre-Gunn case law embracing a broad scope of exclusive federal
jurisdiction over state law claims.
Concurrent jurisdiction would avoid some but not all of those
difficulties. Federal courts deciding motions to remand in removal cases
would still have to apply the unsettled “arising under” doctrine to
determine whether the federal court has original jurisdiction.298 But if the
defendant did not try to remove, which sometimes occurs in state law
cases involving embedded patent issues,299 federal jurisdiction would be
unavailable once the thirty-day deadline for removal passed.300 Although
the number of state appellate decisions dismissing patent-related cases

296. See, e.g., Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 636–39 (Tex. 2011) (finding
that the state courts lacked jurisdiction after the trial court had granted summary
judgment and the state court of appeals had affirmed), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
297. See supra Part II.A.
298. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (providing that “any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction[]
may be removed” to federal court).
299. See, e.g., Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634.
300. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2012).

2014:11

Patent Law Federalism

63

for lack of jurisdiction is relatively small, those cases do exist,301 and late
jurisdictional objections are unsuccessfully raised in many more cases.
That said, in cases in which the district court denied a motion to remand
filed by the plaintiff, the denial of the motion to remand would be
appealable after a final judgment,302 and the federal appellate court
would have to wrestle with the question of whether the plaintiff’s claim
arose under federal law. Thus, concurrent jurisdiction would save state
courts from having to decide difficult questions about the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, but the federal district and appellate courts would still
face questions about their own “arising under” jurisdiction.303
Another possible reason to support concurrent patent jurisdiction
with a right of removal is that exclusive jurisdiction overrides the parties’
right to choose what they believe is the optimal forum. Respecting the
parties’ choice would seem to have inherent benefits. As Martin Redish
has noted, concurrent jurisdiction “employ[s] the litigants as our
jurisdictional watchdogs.”304 Because they are “[m]otivated by
self-interest,” Redish argues, “the litigants in an individual case will be
driven to choose the forum that will provide them with better justice.”305
For example, if a particular state court attracted a large patent caseload
because it processed cases efficiently, that caseload would signal to other
courts how to improve their processes.
On the other hand, the forum that the parties find to be in their
self-interest might not always align with the public interest—a
consideration that could justify overriding party preference. Lynn
LoPucki, for example, has argued that permitting large corporations to
file for bankruptcy in practically any federal judicial district has led
bankruptcy courts to compete to be as friendly as possible to the debtor’s
management, a position that is often harmful to the company’s

301. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 93 Cal. Rptr.
3d 220, 221 (Ct. App. 2009); Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 736 N.E.2d 434, 441
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000); Miracle Boot Puller Co. Ltd. v. Plastray Corp., 269 N.W.2d 496,
498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); Gunn, 355 S.W.3d at 636.
302. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1987); see also
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 640–42 (2006) (noting that the grant of a
motion to remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable, citing 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d)).
303. Of course, the most straightforward way to end litigation over whether a
state law claim arises under federal law would be to simply limit arising under
jurisdiction to claims actually created by federal law. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne &
Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (“A suit arises under the law that
creates the cause of action.”).
304. Redish, supra note 15, at 1811.
305. Id.
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creditors.306 In patent law, however, it seems unlikely that concurrent
state-federal jurisdiction would create unsavory judicial competition.
Creditors in bankruptcy cases, who stand to suffer the most harm from
judicial competition, have little input about where the case is filed and
adjudicated. By contrast, under a regime of concurrent state-federal
patent jurisdiction, a defendant would have the right to remove a case
from state court to the local federal district court, permitting it to escape
a state court it viewed as unsatisfactory.
If anything, concerns about questionable judicial competition
already exist in the current system of exclusive jurisdiction. The Eastern
District of Texas in particular has been derided as a haven for
forum-shopping patent plaintiffs.307 That court, the story goes, has been
competing to attract patent cases in the wake of tort reform in the State of
Texas and the decline of the local oil and railroad industries.308 The
Federal Circuit, for its part, seems aware of the perceived problems with
so many high stakes patent matters being decided in Marshall, Texas
(population 23,523).309 The court has recently granted several petitions
filed by defendants seeking to transfer Eastern District patent cases to
more convenient locations.310 But there is only so much the Federal
Circuit can do because the federal venue statute for patent infringement
cases offers most plaintiffs many acceptable options, permitting
infringement cases against corporations to be filed in any district where
the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction.311 Thus, although
concurrent state-federal jurisdiction would at first blush appear to create
opportunities for unseemly judicial competition and forum shopping, the
marginal difference between exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction may

306. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 17–19 (2005).
307. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Plaintiff Paradise, FORBES, Aug. 20, 2009,
available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0907/outfront-patent-law-texas-plaintiffparadise.html.
308. See Ronen Avraham & John M. Golden, From PI to IP: Yet Another
Unexpected Effect of Tort Reform 8–9 n.19 (U. of Tex. Law, Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. 211, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878966; Julie Creswell, So
Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/business/24ward.html.
309. 2010 Population Finder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
popfinder (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
310. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L.
REV. 343, 346 (2012).
311. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1453–55
(2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) and relevant case law).
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be negligible, with concurrent jurisdiction providing the added benefit of
respecting the choice of parties who choose to litigate in state court.312
Concurrent jurisdiction could also provide access to useful
institutional structures that are not present in the federal judiciary. The
PTO, for example, has been collecting public comments on the
possibility of a small claims court for patent cases.313 The aim of a small
claims court would be to provide an economical forum for disputes in
which the amount in controversy is small. Under the current system, the
cost of litigating many patent cases outweighs the benefits. According to
the American Intellectual Property Law Association, the average cost of
a patent infringement suit where less than $1 million is at stake is
$490,000 through the end of discovery and $916,000 through trial.314
Although a patent small claims court might provide better access to
justice in some cases, it is not clear that, on balance, a small claims court
is the optimal solution to the high costs of patent litigation. General small
claims courts are often thought to be pro-business debt collection
courts,315 and a patent small claims court could be used to harass small
defendants.316 Indeed, the idea of a federal patent small claims court was
first floated in the 1980s,317 but previous proposals all failed.
For a project on patent law federalism, the reasons why those
proposals failed are instructive. One reason seems to be that the
proposals were too broad, calling for a new court with nationwide
jurisdiction.318 Also, the proposals had not been tested on a smaller scale,
so there was no evidence that a small claims court would be
successful.319 Those shortcomings suggest that developing a patent small
claims tribunal could be an ideal policy space to be filled by state
312. The defendant’s removal right would also preserve the Federal Circuit’s
ability to entertain claims that venue is unduly inconvenient. A defendant sued in an
inconvenient state court could remove the case to the local federal court and file a motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the case to a more convenient forum. If the district
court denied the transfer motion, the defendant could seek immediate review in the
Federal Circuit through the writ of mandamus. See Gugliuzza, supra note 310, at 346.
313. See Request for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding in the
United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,830 (Dec. 18, 2012).
314. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY: 2011, at
I-153. (2011).
315. BAUM, supra note 68, at 41 & n.9.
316. See Colleen V. Chien & Michael J. Guo, Does the U.S. Patent System Need
a Patent Small Claims Proceeding? 4 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies
Research
Papers
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
10-13),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249896.
317. Request for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding in the United
States, 77 Fed. Reg. at 74,830.
318. Robert P. Greenspoon, Is the United States Finally Ready for a Patent
Small Claims Court?, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 549, 556 (2009).
319. Id.
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regulation, with the state performing the proverbial “laboratory”
experiment.320
At first glance, it might seem unlikely that a state would create a
patent small claims court—or any kind of specialized patent court. But
more than a dozen states have created or authorized specialized courts
for business disputes.321 A state interested in experimenting with a patent
court could create such a court as an adjunct to its business court.
Importantly, creating a patent court might not even require any
legislative intervention, for existing business courts often have
substantial discretion to organize their dockets.322
In addition to well-known business courts, such as the Commercial
Division of the New York Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of
Chancery, there are other, lesser-known state courts that could offer
benefits to patent litigants. Maryland, for example, has a special program
for business and technology cases.323 Similarly, Delaware has expanded
the Chancery Court’s jurisdiction to include technology disputes where
the claim for damages is $1 million or more.324
The key benefits of business courts are often described using the
neutral virtues of efficiency, accuracy, and uniformity.325 Specifically,
business courts have knowledgeable, specialized judges and streamlined
case management procedures.326 In addition, some supporters tout the

320. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
321. See BAUM, supra note 68, at 191.
322. See, e.g., Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation
and Jurisdiction of Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 147, 160–61,
176–77 (2004) (discussing the Commercial Calendar in Cook County, Illinois, which was
established at the behest of the court’s presiding judge, and a similar program in
Philadelphia).
323. MD. CODE ANN., Courts, Judges, and Attorneys § 16-205 (WEST 2013); see
Anne Tucker Nees, Making a Case for Business Courts: A Survey of and a Proposed
Framework to Evaluate Business Courts, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 477, 508 (2007);
Maryland Business and Technology Case Management Program, MD. CTS.,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/businesstech/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
324. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 346(a)(5) (2013). Technology disputes subject to
Chancery Court jurisdiction include cases relating to:
the purchase or lease of computer hardware; the development, use, licensing
or transfer of computer software; information, biological, pharmaceutical,
agricultural or other technology of a complex or scientific nature that has
commercial value, or the intellectual property rights pertaining thereto; the
creation or operation of Internet web sites; [and] rights or electronic access to
electronic, digital or similar information.
Id. § 346(c)(1).
325. See BAUM, supra note 68, at 208–09.
326. Christopher R. Drahozal, Business Courts and the Future of Arbitration,
10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 492 (2009).
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courts’ benefits to small businesses.327 These are many of the same aims
that policymakers are seeking in the federal system through both a small
claims court and the Pilot Program.
Evidence on the performance of business courts is mostly
anecdotal.328 Lawyers and litigants, however, appear to be relatively
happy with the courts’ performances.329 For example, in 2001, SunTrust
Bank attempted a hostile takeover of Wachovia at the same time
Wachovia was pursuing a friendly merger with First Union.330 These
transactions spawned much litigation, and the three parties agreed to
bring all of their state and federal claims in the North Carolina Business
Court.331 One reason for the courts’ popularity seems to be the strong,
collaborative dialogue between the courts and their local bar. In
Philadelphia, for instance, as part of the Commerce Case Management
Program within the Court of Common Pleas, local lawyers act as judges
pro tempore to mediate disputes and conduct settlement conferences.332
A prominent critique of business courts is that, because of their
specialized caseload, they will become captured by business interests.333
Assuming this criticism to be true, it is not clear that it would map onto a
specialized state patent court. In patent cases, many litigants are
patent-holding plaintiffs in some matters and accused patent infringers in
others. The parties’ changing interests, some have argued, moderate
doctrine from favoring either side.334 That said, many scholars believe
that the creation of the Federal Circuit skewed legal doctrine in favor of
patent validity, but that the court has not been more likely than the
regional circuits before it to find infringement.335 This evidence could be
read to suggest that the Federal Circuit has increased patent activity
generally without favoring either patent holders or accused infringers—
an outcome that patent lawyers might prefer.336 Reasoning by analogy,
327. See Ember Reichgott Junge, Business Courts: Efficient Justice or
Two-Tiered Elitism?, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 315, 317–18 (1998).
328. BAUM, supra note 68, at 194.
329. See generally Bach & Applebaum, supra note 322.
330. Id. at 169.
331. Id.
332. See id. at 176–77 (describing the “working relationship” between courts and
the bar as the “hallmark of the [Philadelphia] Program’s creation, operation, and
success”).
333. See BAUM, supra note 68, at 194 (citing other sources).
334. See Thomas H. Case & Scott R. Miller, An Appraisal of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 301, 310 (1984).
335. See, e.g., Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 114 (2006).
336. A recent study suggests that a high rate of patent validity is in fact a more
important driver of patenting activity than the rate of patent infringement. See Matthew
D. Henry & John L. Turner, Across Five Eras: Patent Enforcement in the United States
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perhaps the most significant danger of capture with a specialized state
patent court would be that the court would become captured by its local
patent litigation bar.337
B. Should Congress Repeal Exclusive Jurisdiction?
To answer the normative question of whether exclusive jurisdiction
should be abolished, it is necessary to return to the issue of distributive
consequences. Those consequences are important because, as discussed,
one of the stronger justifications for exclusive jurisdiction is that the
federal courts are a “forum of excellence” staffed by judges who are
competent technicians and capable of managing complex litigation.338
Under the current model, all patent litigants are forced into federal
court, even if they would prefer state court. Those who have studied the
matter suggest it is more expensive to litigate a case in federal court than
it is to litigate a similar case in state court.339 Pretrial practice in
particular appears to be more expensive in federal court than in state
court.340 Yet some evidence suggests that outcomes are similar in both
state and federal courts, with plaintiffs and defendants faring similarly
well in both arenas.341 Also, although survey data indicates that attorneys
typically favor the jurisdiction that provides faster disposition, in some

1929–2006 at 23 (June 4, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2274383. Specifically, Professors Henry and Turner show that the increase in
the rate of patent validity shortly after the Federal Circuit was created coincided with a
surge in patenting and litigation, but that a drop in the rate of patent infringement in 1990
did not lead to a similar reduction in patenting. Id.
337. One might suggest, drawing on the common justification for federal
diversity jurisdiction, that a specialized state court would also be captured by local patent
litigants. Although state courts are often perceived to be biased in favor of local litigants,
there is significant uncertainty about whether state courts are in fact biased. See Debra
Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 144 &
nn.124–26 (2003) (citing studies).
338. See supra notes 286–90 and accompanying text.
339. Herbert M. Kritzer et al., Courts and Litigation Investment: Why Do
Lawyers Spend More Time on Federal Cases?, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 7, 8 (1984); Miller, supra
note 287, at 405.
340. See Kritzer et al., supra note 339, at 12–15.
341. Herbert M. Kritzer et al., Winners and Losers in Litigation: Does Anyone
Come Out Ahead?, in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS: READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND
BEHAVIOR 516, 523 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 2d ed. 1989); see also David
M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 118 (1983)
(finding that defendants are more successful in federal court, but that the difference in
success between state and federal courts is not statistically significant). But see Clermont
& Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 593–96 (concluding that plaintiffs fare worse in cases
removed from state to federal court than in cases originally filed in federal court).
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areas it is the federal court that moves faster and in others it is the state
court.342
Taking these general descriptions of litigation costs and benefits as
true, and to map onto patent cases, exclusive federal patent jurisdiction
would seem to favor large litigants over small litigants because large
litigants can spend the greater amount of money required to pursue or
defend their claims. Small plaintiffs can potentially overcome this
disadvantage through the use of contingent attorneys’ fees, which is an
increasingly popular source of funding patent litigation.343 Serial
plaintiffs (many of whom would be described as patent trolls) would also
seem to gain an advantage from exclusive federal jurisdiction, which
permits them to use the relative expense of federal litigation as leverage
to force settlement. From the standpoint of litigation finance, therefore,
federal jurisdiction might most disadvantage small litigants who are
defendants. These observations suggest that policymakers at both the
state and federal levels are, generally speaking, making good decisions in
efforts to combat spurious litigation and by considering the possibility of
a patent small claims court.
Should exclusive federal jurisdiction be repealed? In my view, it is
difficult to envision significant harm flowing from such a change. The
argument for concurrent jurisdiction is strongest in state law cases
involving patents that are no longer in force. Even the Federal Circuit
appears to concede that, under Gunn, these “purely ‘backward-looking’”
state law claims do not arise under federal law,344 so even without a
legislative change, those claims should now be heard exclusively in state
court unless there is some other ground for federal jurisdiction, such as
diversity.
When it comes to state law claims involving patents still in force,
the case for exclusive federal jurisdiction is stronger. As explained
above, a state court’s resolution of an embedded patent issue could be
preclusive in later federal litigation.345 And it is possible that a state
court, due to its inexperience with patent matters, might be more likely
than a federal court to incorrectly resolve that patent issue. Yet, as the
Supreme Court unanimously noted in Gunn, the preclusive effect of a
state court decision “would be limited to the parties and patents that had
342. Bumiller, supra note 287, at 762–63; see also Miller, supra note 287, at 405
(reporting a survey of attorneys in removal cases indicating that 45.4 percent of defense
counsel chose to remove to federal court because of its faster process and that 31.4
percent of plaintiff attorneys chose state court because of its faster process).
343. David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 337–39 (2012).
344. Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 715 F.3d 1329,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1066–67 (2013)).
345. See supra notes 248–51 and accompanying text.
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been before the state court,” and “[s]uch ‘fact-bound and
situation-specific’ effects are not sufficient to” divest the state courts of
jurisdiction.346 Moreover, state law cases involving embedded patent
issues regularly turn on difficult or disputed questions of state law.347 It
seems questionable to place those state law cases exclusively within the
realm of the federal courts.
The strongest case for continued federal exclusivity involves
infringement and declaratory judgment claims created by federal law.
Comity concerns in particular might create unease about a state court
determining the scope and validity of a patent issued by the federal
government. In the context of international litigation, comity has swayed
courts from adjudicating claims involving patents issued by other
countries.348 Yet these international rules of exclusive jurisdiction have
not been unanimously embraced by courts and scholars.349 In any event,
it does not seem that domestic comity should be an insurmountable
barrier to concurrent jurisdiction over patent cases. State courts have the
power to adjudicate all types of legal claims arising under federal law
unless Congress specifically provides otherwise.350 Indeed, state courts
have long had the power to decide infringement and validity issues in
cases involving federal trademarks.351 Purely as a matter of comity, state
court invalidation of a federal patent does not seem much different. On
balance, therefore, I would likely support a proposal that granted the

346. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v.
McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006)).
347. See, e.g., Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1035 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Most of the
recent malpractice cases on this court’s docket turn on state law matters such as statutes
of limitations, statutes of repose, or evidentiary issues.” (citing cases)).
348. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding
that a federal district court lacked jurisdiction over claims for infringement of European,
British, Canadian, French, and German patents); Marketa Trimble, GAT, Solvay, and the
Centralization of Patent Litigation in Europe, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 515, 519 (2012)
(discussing European Union law prohibiting domestic courts from deciding the validity
of foreign patents).
349. See, e.g., MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT 59–65 (2012) (discussing law reform proposals and a Japanese judicial
decision that would permit adjudication of foreign patents); see also BENEDETTA
UBERTAZZI, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 295 (2012) (suggesting
that “the arguments for extending the act of State and comity doctrines to [intellectual
property rights] are [un]convincing”).
350. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
351. See, e.g., Duggan’s Funeral Serv., Inc. v. Duggan’s Serra Mortuary, Inc.,
95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 253, 257 (Ct. App. 2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (2012) (granting
the federal courts original but not exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under the
Lanham Act).
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state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over cases arising under
patent law while preserving a right of removal for defendants.
C. Institutional Entrenchment
The primary objective of this Article, however, has not been to
advocate for a repeal of exclusive jurisdiction because such a reform
would likely have little practical effect on the distribution of patent cases.
Because of the current system of exclusive jurisdiction, patent lawyers
are by far more familiar with federal court and with the special patent
rules that exist in many districts. It is hard to envision Existing literature
suggests than an important factor for lawyers in choosing between state
and federal court is familiarity with the jurisdiction.352 seasoned patent
lawyers consenting to the jurisdiction of a state court. Under a regime of
concurrent jurisdiction, therefore, plaintiffs would likely continue to file
the vast majority of their patent suits in federal court, and defendants,
even if they were sued in state court, would likely remove most cases to
federal court. Federal courts have developed a reputation for handling
patent cases and this reputation invites, in the words of Michael Solimine
and James Walker, “the perpetuation of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Lawyers think that state courts are incompetent to deal with federal
claims, and they go to federal court. State courts are less familiar with
federal claims because the lawyers go to federal courts, and so on.”353
Moreover, even if attorneys from both sides were willing to submit
to state jurisdiction, their experiment would probably be short lived. If a
state’s courts developed a reputation for being “unfriendly” to patents
(by, for example, rarely finding infringement or rarely upholding
validity), patent holders would cease filing there. Conversely, if a
particular state was viewed as patent friendly, accused infringers would
remove every case filed in that jurisdiction. And if no state can attract a
critical mass of patent cases, the potential benefits of concurrent
jurisdiction would not materialize. For example, state courts would be
unable to percolate patent doctrine if they heard very few patent cases.
One way to break this cycle would be to eliminate removal in patent
cases. A prohibition on removal would not be unprecedented.
Defendants, for example, are not permitted to remove a case solely on
the basis of diversity if the defendant is a resident of the state in which
the case is filed.354 But an example will show that, if there were
concurrent jurisdiction over patent cases, limiting removal would be
unwise. Suppose a potential infringer filed a declaratory judgment suit in
352.
353.
354.

See Flango, supra note 283, at 81; Miller, supra note 287, at 400–01, 425.
SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 16, at 70.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012).
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state court, seeking a declaration of noninfringement. These declaratory
judgment suits are common in patent law, and are usually met with a
counterclaim for infringement.355 Under a regime of concurrent
jurisdiction with a right of removal, the patent holder could remove the
declaratory judgment case to federal court. But even without removal,
the patent holder would still have an avenue into federal court—it could
simply file its claim for infringement there.356 In general, nothing
prohibits state courts and federal courts from simultaneously entertaining
similar lawsuits.357 In the situation of parallel state-federal litigation, the
first judgment entered would be entitled to preclusive effect.358 Although
it is conceivable that one of the courts would stay or dismiss its case in
light of the other proceeding,359 mere duplication of effort and
inefficiency generally are not viewed as sufficient grounds to stay or
dismiss.360 Thus, concurrent jurisdiction without removal could
encourage wasteful, duplicative patent litigation as the parties race to
judgment in multiple courts.361

355. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 41, 61–65 (2012).
356. Indeed, under a system of concurrent jurisdiction, the patent holder might
prefer to file a separate infringement suit in federal court rather than filing an
infringement counterclaim in the original case. Under the removal statute, a case may be
removed only to the federal district embracing the state court in which the suit was
originally filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). But by filing a separate suit, the patent holder
could choose any district in which jurisdiction and venue are proper.
357. See, e.g., Burns v. Walter, 931 F.2d 140, 145 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[W]hen a
state court and a federal court enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over a particular suit, they
both may, and, under some circumstances, must, proceed with the respective litigations
simultaneously.”).
358. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922).
359. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
818 (1976) (discussing the ability of federal courts to dismiss a case “due to the presence
of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration”); see also
6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 124, § 1418 (discussing stays in the context of parallel
state-federal litigation).
360. See, e.g., Villa Marina Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Hatteras Yachts, 915 F.2d 7, 13
(1st Cir. 1990). See generally 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 124, § 4247 (discussing
additional cases).
361. See James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the
Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1064–65 (1994) (discussing the costs of
duplicative state-federal litigation). Although the infringement counterclaim in the
example discussed would probably be compulsory in the state court declaratory judgment
suit, see Megan M. La Belle, “Reverse” Patent Declaratory Judgment Actions: A
Proposed Solution for Medtronic, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 43, 53 (2013), available at
http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-43.pdf, the most likely
sanction for failure to file the counterclaim would be that claim preclusion would bar the
patent holder from asserting the infringement claim, see 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
124, § 1418. Claim preclusion, however, would not take effect until the state court
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Another way to limit removal under concurrent jurisdiction, besides
barring
removal
altogether,
would
be
to
impose
an
amount-in-controversy requirement for patent cases to be subject to
federal jurisdiction. An amount-in-controversy requirement currently
applies to diversity cases,362 and the general federal question statute
imposed a similar requirement until 1980.363 Indeed, a few statutes still
condition
federal
question
jurisdiction
on
a
minimum
Imposing
an
amount-in-controversy
amount-in-controversy.364
requirement for patent cases could have the interesting effect of turning
state courts into de facto small claims courts for patent cases. That said,
any amount-in-controversy requirement imposes difficulties in
administration;365 it was those difficulties that spurred Congress to
abandon the requirement for federal question cases.366 Moreover, an
amount-in-controversy requirement intended to keep low-stakes patent
cases out of federal court could have the perverse effect of requiring
litigation over jurisdiction in the smallest patent cases—where concerns
about litigation costs are most critical.367
In short, exclusive jurisdiction appears difficult to undo as a
practical matter. And the reasons for this entrenchment do not seem
unique to patent law; they could apply equally to other areas of exclusive
actually entered a judgment in the declaratory judgment action, see id., meaning that the
infringement claim could proceed in a federal court until the state case concluded.
362. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).
363. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 47, at 1377.
364. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012) (requiring $10,000 amount in
controversy for suits based on violations of consumer product safety rules).
365. See, e.g., 14AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 124, § 3702.1 (examining the
amount-in-controversy analysis in cases removed from state court to federal court and
describing steps the federal courts have taken to “stem the flood of remand motions
asserting a lack of amount in controversy”).
366. S. REP. NO. 96-827, at 1 (1980); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1461, at 2 (1980); see
also Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2,
94 Stat. 2369, 2369 (eliminating the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal
question cases).
367. A more radical way to break the cycle of removal under concurrent
jurisdiction would be to allow state courts to certify questions of patent law to the Federal
Circuit, much as federal courts can certify questions of state law to state supreme courts.
See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions
of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1674 (2003). One objection to such a “reverse”
certification procedure would be that it violates the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article III. See Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . . ,
29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 677, 685 (1995). State courts that, like the federal courts, are
prohibited from issuing advisory opinions have reached mixed results on the
constitutionality of certified question statutes. See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 124,
§ 4248. In any event, a more salient objection to a reverse certification procedure in
patent cases is that it would impede the doctrinal percolation that concurrent jurisdiction
is aimed to stimulate.
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federal jurisdiction, such as copyright, antitrust, securities, and
bankruptcy.368 Exclusive federal jurisdiction precludes state courts from
developing familiarity with those areas of law and prevents lawyers
practicing in those areas from developing familiarity with the state
courts. Because of that dynamic, most cases in areas currently subject to
exclusive federal jurisdiction would probably remain in the federal
courts, even if exclusive jurisdiction were repealed. Thus, future
legislative discussions about jurisdictional policy should acknowledge
that it is difficult to achieve an effective repeal of exclusive jurisdiction.
The difficulty of effectively repealing exclusive jurisdiction also
illustrates the peculiar susceptibility of certain institutional arrangements
to become deeply entrenched over the long term, even though they seem
normatively questionable.369 Exclusive jurisdiction is not the only
example of an entrenched-but-arguably-suboptimal institutional
arrangement in the field of federal jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction is
another prime example. It has been loudly criticized370 but is not going
anywhere.371 Closer to the field of patent law, the notion of eliminating
the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction seems to have little political
traction, even though many scholars—and at least two federal judges—
have questioned the wisdom of centralizing patent appeals.372 Future
work might closely examine these entrenched judicial institutions and
consider both what causes their path dependence and what distinguishes
them from institutions and procedural mechanisms that are more
susceptible to change.373
Answers to these questions could have important implications for
ongoing debates about patent reform. Because different innovating
industries have different views about the optimal substantive content of
368. See generally Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 471 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (collecting examples of exclusive federal jurisdiction).
369. See Levinson, supra note 19, at 672.
370. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97,
102–05.
371. See RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.5.2, at 174 (3d ed. 2012). Of
course, the required amount in controversy has been periodically increased, but the last
such increase was in 1997, and the required minimum amount remains the relatively
modest sum of $75,000.01. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
372. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 276, at 230; Nard & Duffy, supra
note 86, at 1623; Wood, supra note 277, at 10; David Haas et al., An Interview with
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, STOUT RISUIS ROSS (Fall 2013),
http://www.srr.com/article/interview-judge-richard-posner-patent-litigation (“I don’t
think it’s a good idea to have a specialized appellate court. I don’t think the Federal
Circuit has been a success, so I’d return patent appellate responsibility to the regional
circuits, where it was before 1982.”).
373. Cf. Levinson, supra note 19, at 694 (arguing that political decision-making
institutions become entrenched because they represent “bundles” of uncertain future
policy outcomes, which blunt sustained resistance).
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patent law,374 contemporary reforms have focused mostly on matters of
procedure and institutional structure—such as creating additional
mechanisms by which interested parties can challenge patent validity375
and allowing judges in certain judicial districts to specialize in patent
cases.376 In addition, proposals currently pending in Congress would shift
attorneys’ fees to the losing party in patent litigation377 and impose a
heightened pleading standard on patent infringement plaintiffs.378 But by
focusing on procedure and institutions rather than on substance,
Congress could be making policy that will prove exceedingly difficult to
change in the future. Thus, Congress might consider including sunset
provisions in future reforms, as it did in the statute creating the Pilot
Program.379
CONCLUSION
Rethinking patent jurisdiction illustrates that conversations about
patent law’s institutional structure should discuss not only broad
concerns about uniformity and substantive expertise, but also more
nuanced considerations, such as the adjudicative uniformity provided by
federal preclusion doctrine and the expertise of federal judges in
managing complex civil litigation. Future work could usefully apply the
theoretical framework developed by this Article to evaluate other areas
of exclusive federal jurisdiction and to jurisdiction in other fields of
intellectual property.
Under this framework, the justifications for exclusive federal
jurisdiction, if any, may be unique to each individual substantive area. In
bankruptcy, for instance, exclusive jurisdiction might actually provide a
substantial quantum of legal expertise because of the existence of federal
bankruptcy judges.380 In antitrust, by contrast, state judges might
374. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 4 (2009).
375. See Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 632–39 (2012)
(discussing new and reformed PTO proceedings created by the America Invents Act).
376. See Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat.
3674 (2011); see also supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text (discussing the Pilot
Program).
377. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
378. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); Patent Abuse
Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 2.
379. Pilot Program § 1(c), 124 Stat. at 3675 (providing that the program will end
after ten years); see also Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 9(g) (2013)
(extending the duration of the Pilot Program to twenty years).
380. There is empirical support for the notion that bankruptcy judges provide
useful expertise. Bankruptcy appeals may be heard in the first instance either by panels of
bankruptcy judges sitting as a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), or by a district judge,
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themselves have a modest amount of relevant experience because
antitrust statutes exist in every state, and most of those state statutes are
similar to the federal antitrust laws.381
This fine-grained approach could also be used to assess jurisdiction
in other areas of intellectual property law. For example, the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under the copyright
laws,382 but there is no centralized appellate court for copyright appeals.
By contrast, the state and federal courts share concurrent jurisdiction
over trademark cases, but the Federal Circuit is the sole appellate forum
for appeals from registration proceedings at the PTO.383 Appeals in
trademark litigation, as in copyright litigation, are heard by the regional
circuits. The heterogeneity in jurisdictional structure among the three
fields of federal intellectual property law invites a comparative analysis.

and one study suggests that, as measured by affirmance and citation rates, BAP decisions
are perceived to be of higher quality than decisions by district judges. Jonathan Remy
Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the
Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2008).
381. See Solimine, supra note 15, at 430.
382. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
383. See § 1295(a)(4)(B).
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APPENDIX
FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT,
OCTOBER TERM 2001 THROUGH OCTOBER TERM 2012
Case

Disposition

J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc.,
534 U.S. 124 (2001)

Affirmed

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co.,
535 U.S. 722 (2002)

Vacated

Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys.,
Inc.,
535 U.S. 826 (2002)

Vacated

Merck KGaA v. Intergra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 193 (2005)

Vacated

Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.,
546 U.S. 394 (2006)

Reversed

Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28 (2006)

Vacated

eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388 (2006)

Vacated

Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs.,
Inc.,
548 U.S. 124 (2006)

Dismissed as
improvidently
granted

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118 (2007)

Reversed

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398 (2007)

Reversed

Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
550 U.S. 437 (2007)

Reversed

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
553 U.S. 617 (2008)

Reversed

Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.,
556 U.S. 635 (2009)

Reversed

Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)

Affirmed
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Case

Disposition

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011)

Affirmed

Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche
Molecular Sys., Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011)

Affirmed

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship,
131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011)

Affirmed

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)

Reversed

Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S,
132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012)

Reversed

Kappos v. Hyatt,
132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012)

Affirmed

Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013)

Affirmed

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)

Affirmed in part,
reversed in part

